An Analysis of Weapon System Cost Growth

Drezner, Jeffrey A.; Jarvaise, Jeanne M.; Hess, Ron; Hough, Paul G.; Norton, Daniel M.

doi:10.21236/ada282160

Cited by 45 publications

(45 citation statements)

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“…Based initiatives, there on a review of has been no stfe-269 completed stantial irrprouede f en se contracts, we found that the Packard Commission's recommendations did not reduce cost overruns. This result is consistent with similar research involving an analysis of cost growth on 197 defense acquisition programs (Drezner, Jarvaise, Hough, & Norton, 1993). Despite the implementation of more than two dozen regulatory and administration initiatives, there has been no substantial improvement in the cost performance of defense programs for more than 30 years.…”

Section: President Ronald Reagan Establishedsupporting

confidence: 88%

“…Likewise, because programs compete for limited resources, there is an incentive to accept low estimates as reasonable. Drezner et al (1993) could not test this assertion, but did report that the average initial cost estimates were systematically understated. This finding is consistent with results reported by others (General Accounting Office [GAO], 1988;Tyson, Harmon, & Utech, 1989;McNichols, McFarland, KcKinney, & Balut, 1984;Christensen, 1994Christensen, ,1996.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 98%

“…The Department of Defense (DoD) has not ignored this problem. As shown in Table 1, Drezner et al (1993) identify several important regulatory and administrative initiatives to improve defense cost performance. The expectation was that as these initiatives were implemented, cost performance would improve through time.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Using data from the DoD Selected Acquisition Report (SAR), Drezner et al (1993) computed the average cost growth on 197 acquisition programs with start dates from 1960 through 1990. Results show that cost growth fluctuated around 20 percent, with no substantial improvement through time.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Using data from selected acquisition reports, Drezner et al (1993) show that reform initiatives from 1960 to 1990 did not reduce cost growth on 197 defense programs. The average cost growth on these programs was 20 percent and did not change significantly for 30 years.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

See 4 more Smart Citations

The Impact of the Packard Commission's Recommendations on Reducing Cost Overruns on Defense Acquisition Contracts

Christensen¹,

Stearle²,

Vickery³

1999

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Section: President Ronald Reagan Establishedsupporting

confidence: 88%

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 98%

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

mentioning

confidence: 99%

See 3 more Smart Citations

The Impact of the Packard Commission's Recommendations on Reducing Cost Overruns on Defense Acquisition Contracts

Christensen¹,

Stearle²,

Vickery³

1999

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Government and Defense Context

Rouse

Bodner

2010

The Economics of Human Systems Integration

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3.2.2 A More Flexible Approach to Valuing Flexibility

Ryan

Jacques

Colombi

2011

INCOSE International Symp

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Abstract. The DOD routinely demonstrates its capability to develop phenomenal systems; however, these accomplishments are often tarnished by substantial cost and schedule overruns. While defense policies are continually being revised to address these problems, many believe that a more fundamental source of these overruns is the lack of flexibility in the systems being developed. But providing justification to invest in flexibility is a tough sell, as stakeholders struggle to quantitatively demonstrate the potential return on investment. Therefore, this paper introduces an alternative methodology for valuing the inherent ability of a system or design to accommodate change. The proposed methodology is essentially a modification of the current life cycle model and is premised on the notion that the need for capability changes in a program arise in a stochastic manner that can be incorporated into a continually updated, expected value model presented in terms of total program cost.

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An Analysis of Weapon System Cost Growth

Cited by 45 publications

References 0 publications

The Impact of the Packard Commission's Recommendations on Reducing Cost Overruns on Defense Acquisition Contracts

The Impact of the Packard Commission's Recommendations on Reducing Cost Overruns on Defense Acquisition Contracts

Government and Defense Context

3.2.2 A More Flexible Approach to Valuing Flexibility

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