1990
DOI: 10.1016/0165-4101(90)90041-2
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An empirical examination of debt covenant restrictions and accounting-related debt proxies

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Cited by 224 publications
(120 citation statements)
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“…Assuming that a venturer's proximity to covenant limits and the cost of violating those covenants are both positively related to its leverage (Duke and Hunt, 1990;Press and Weintrop, 1990), and bearing in mind that the change to proportionate consolidation carries an increase in leverage, a negative relationship between leverage and the choice of proportionate consolidation is predicted. Some studies measure the proximity to covenant limits based on leverage in relative rather than absolute terms (e.g.…”
Section: Debt Contractsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Assuming that a venturer's proximity to covenant limits and the cost of violating those covenants are both positively related to its leverage (Duke and Hunt, 1990;Press and Weintrop, 1990), and bearing in mind that the change to proportionate consolidation carries an increase in leverage, a negative relationship between leverage and the choice of proportionate consolidation is predicted. Some studies measure the proximity to covenant limits based on leverage in relative rather than absolute terms (e.g.…”
Section: Debt Contractsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Defond and Jiambalvo (1994) have concluded that as the firm reaches the situation where it cannot fulfill its financial obligations, the earnings management practices increase to enhance the image of the company. Duke and Hunt (1990) have concluded that there is a direct and significant relation between the debt ratio and earnings management practicing.…”
Section: Control Variablesmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that debt may be a source of agency problem between shareholders and creditors or between managers and shareholders. Debt provides low opportunities for growth and is a proxy for debtcovenants incentives to manipulate (Duke and Hunt, 1990;Daley and Vigeland, 1983). Hence, based on the debt assumption, the more firms are indebted the more likely they are close critical thresholds covenants is high (Saada, 1995).…”
Section: Firm Leveragementioning
confidence: 99%