2013
DOI: 10.1177/0738894212456936
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An Epidemic Model of Violence and Public Support in Civil War

Abstract: How do civilians respond to violence in civil war, and how do these responses shape combatants’ coercive strategies? Conventional wisdom expects civilian victimization to backfire, as a security-minded public “balances” against the side posing the greatest threat to its livelihood and survival. Yet combatants often expect a terrorized population to do the opposite, “bandwagoning” with those most willing and capable to inflict harm. Using an epidemic model of popular support dynamics, I explore the logic of bal… Show more

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Cited by 20 publications
(16 citation statements)
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“…The fact that explanatory mechanisms can be context dependent falls in line with the highly localized data and analysis that we employ below. As we have indicated, the logic for this basic concept can be found in studies of insurgency and rebellion (Kalyvas ; Kalyvas and Kocher ; Lyall and Wilson ; Condra et al ; Lyall ; Kocher, Pepinsky, and Kalyvas ; Zhukov ). The theoretical argument in this body of research states that population attitudes and beliefs define the possibility of violence taking place, because a local population either protects or betrays those individuals who are willing to commit violence.…”
Section: Propositions: the Conflict Diffusion Modelmentioning
confidence: 85%
“…The fact that explanatory mechanisms can be context dependent falls in line with the highly localized data and analysis that we employ below. As we have indicated, the logic for this basic concept can be found in studies of insurgency and rebellion (Kalyvas ; Kalyvas and Kocher ; Lyall and Wilson ; Condra et al ; Lyall ; Kocher, Pepinsky, and Kalyvas ; Zhukov ). The theoretical argument in this body of research states that population attitudes and beliefs define the possibility of violence taking place, because a local population either protects or betrays those individuals who are willing to commit violence.…”
Section: Propositions: the Conflict Diffusion Modelmentioning
confidence: 85%
“…Conversely, there is a higher likelihood of civilian victimization when territorial control is relatively solid but incomplete (hegemonic). As Zhukov (2013) notes, however, this expectation hinges on the assumption that civilians will choose balancing instead of bandwagoning when deciding to co-operate with one faction or another. The idea is that if two groups have similar territorial control, neither has enough intelligence to identify opponents and pursue selective violence.…”
Section: Dynamics Of One-sided Violence In Civil Warsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Indiscriminate violence against civilians would backfire, as civilians would then support the group that uses less violence to seek protection. By relaxing this assumption about civilians’ balancing against violent perpetrators, Zhukov (2013, 45) shows that one-sided violence is also likely in areas that are fully controlled and that even opponents in very weak positions may have incentives to target civilians.…”
Section: Dynamics Of One-sided Violence In Civil Warsmentioning
confidence: 99%
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“…Similar approaches have been developed for domestic conflicts, including civil war (Garrison, 2008;Zhukov, 2013), guerrilla war (Dietchman, 1962;Intrilligator, 1988) and protest, coercion and revolution (Tsebelis, 1989). The majority use a differential formulation and are inspired by combat modelling or population 3 biology.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%