An ‘improbable Paris-Berlin-Commission triangle’: usages of Europe and the revival of EU defense cooperation after 2016

A reluctant European: How Norway responds to the EU’s quest for strategic autonomy

“…Then President of the European Commission Jean-Claude Juncker’s ambitions for a European Defence Union to create a role for the EU within the defence field, which were worked on in close cooperation with the French and German authorities, are illustrative of the ongoing changes in European security and defence at this time. In this regard, Kongsberg Defence and Aerospace AS was witnessing a convergence of state, European Commission and defence industrial interests (Béraud-Sudreau and Pannier 2020, 10), which made it necessary for the company to follow these developments. As a result of Juncker’s ambitions, the defence package materialised, changing the nature of the European defence market.…”

When politics trumps strategy: UK–EU security collaboration after Brexit

“…This reality had a number of implications for security and defence collaboration. To begin with, and as we discuss in detail below, it led the Union to prioritise reforms in security and defence policy which de facto diminished London’s ability to participate (Bérard-Sudreau and Pannier, 2020: 5–6). Moreover, forestalling contagion all but required Brussels to preclude offering the UK a generous deal, including access to elements of EU policymaking on an a la carte basis, or without the trappings of membership.…”

“…Second, Brexit has facilitated a number of key reforms on the EU side which have emerged gradually as the negotiations have proceeded. While the initial motivation behind these initiatives came from the prior recognition of Europe’s weakness in an increasingly insecure world (European Commission, 2013: 3), Brexit helped bring about a reform moment within the EU, forcing the Union to address the capability gap brought about by Brexit and to show that further integration was still viable (Bérard-Sudreau and Pannier, 2020: 6), whilst simultaneously removing the UK as a veto player in this domain (Euractive, 2011). The significant initiatives which have emerged from the EU’s momentum in security and defence include the creation of the EU military headquarters, the Military Planning and Conduct Capability (MPCC), the launch of Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) which facilitates binding cooperation on defence projects between specific groups of interested member states (Sweeney and Winn, 2020: 226), the establishment of a European Defence Fund (EDF) through which community funds will be allocated for technological innovation, defence research and technology (Koenig and Walter-Franke, 2017), and the instigation of a Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD) to identify possibilities for the further pooling of resources.…”

Toward a more ‘sovereign’ Europe? Domestic, bilateral, and European factors to explain France’s (growing) influence on EU politics, 2017–2022

“…Béraud-Sudreau and Pannier ( 2021 : 300–301) remark that “strategic autonomy was a priority of France’s European policy since the 1990s” and that the country “pushed this term to become part of the European vocabulary.” A longstanding component of the strategic autonomy agenda, still intact under the Macron Presidency, has been the emergence of companies of critical size that are able to compete with US producers (Faure 2020a : 93). Arguably, “strategic autonomy is not primarily about defense itself but the mastery of critical military technologies” (Interview 10).…”

“…Having the support of many EU-level stakeholders, a defense industry lobbyist explained that “[they] hoped him to stay in power” (Interview 9). Leaked emails further revealed that Macron and his party had already developed a working relationship with the Commission on defense industrial policy during his first presidential campaign (Béraud-Sudreau and Pannier 2021 : 300).…”