An Old Couple in a New Setting: Franco-German Leadership in the Post-Brexit EU

Abstract

What are the implications of Brexit for the nature, role, and potential of Franco-German leadership in the EU? Brexit, we contend, is both an expression and a further cause of two broader underlying developments in the contemporary EU: First, a stronger and more prominent German part and position, and second, disintegrative tendencies in several EU policy fields and the EU polity as a whole. This, in turn, has major implications for Franco-German bilateralism and for Franco-German leadership in the EU. In light of a stronger Germany, a relatively weaker France, and significant centrifugal forces, the two largest EU member states must not only realign their bilateral relationship but must also act as a stabilizer in and for the EU. We show that during the EU’s recent crises, not least during the Brexit negotiations and the recovery from the Covid-19 pandemic, France and Germany did exercise joint leadership. We also show, however, that major discrepancies persist between the two countries in particular policy fields and with regard to longer-term European objectives. Brexit, with its numerous calamities and implications, thus once again moves Franco-German leadership—and its shortcomings—to center stage in Europe. When it comes to leadership in the EU, there remains no viable alternative to the Franco-German duo. Yet, in order to provide constructive leadership and successfully shape the EU, the two countries must bridge substantial differences and be ready to carry disproportionately high burdens.

EU(ropean) Differentiated Defence Integration

“…As decisions made in this format are dependent on consensus between France and Germany, finding common ground will move the process forward. As Krotz and Schramm (2021) show in a recent analysis of the Franco-German cooperation, France and Germany have in recent years exercised joint leadership in times of existential crisis-in response to the Eurozone crises, the migration crisis and then in response to the COVID-19 crisis. The radical shifts in European security and transatlantic relations we have been witnessing are therefore likely to motivate closer Franco-German cooperation in the field of defence.…”

“…It has been emphasised that Germany reacted remarkably passively to Macron's many advances in this field following his 2017 election-whether it was to focus efforts and investments on creating an autonomous European defence, or the creation of a common strategic culture, intervention force or defence budget (Krotz & Schramm, 2021). However, this attitude has since been modified, first in response to a deeper and more structural transatlantic divide, and second in response to Russian aggression.…”

Embedded Bilateralism, Integration Theory, and European Crisis Politics: France, Germany, and the Birth of the EU Corona Recovery Fund*

“…For example, despite the various EU enlargement rounds, France and Germany's joint economic resources still account for around 40 per cent of the EU's overall economic output, making their consent a necessary condition for any EU‐level decision requiring large amounts of money. Brexit has further increased France and Germany's relative weight and visibility in the EU, turning them (again) into the two remaining large member states (Krotz and Schramm, 2021). What is more, due to their historical legacy, important role in European integration, and prominent part within Europe today, both countries often share a sense of special responsibility for the stability, cohesion, and future of the EU.…”

Assessing What Brexit Means for Europe: Implications for EU Institutions and Actors

“…If the British referendum already set in pace Brexitrelated changes, the UK formal withdrawal from the EU in early 2020 unleashed new, or reinforced pre-existing institutional dynamics. As Krotz and Schramm (2021) argue, Franco-German leadership became stronger with Brexit. This was due not only to the rules for qualified majority in the Council-with the new weights for the double majority, of states and population, favouring the medium and large member states-but mainly to the necessity of Franco-German leadership to overcome the existential crises of the EU, Brexit included.…”