Analysis and Interventions in Large Network Games

Parise, Francesca; Ozdaglar, Asuman

doi:10.1146/annurev-control-072020-084434

Cited by 29 publications

(31 citation statements)

References 153 publications

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“…Information design is one form of intervention mechanism to influence behavior of strategic agents [6,28]. Other intervention mechanisms include providing financial incentives [6,29,30], system utility design [31,32,33,34,35], and nudging or player control during learning dynamics [36,37,38,39,40].…”

Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

Social Welfare Maximization and Conformism via Information Design in Linear-Quadratic-Gaussian Games

Sezer¹,

Khazaei²,

Eksin³

2021

Preprint

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We consider linear-quadratic Gaussian (LQG) games in which players have quadratic payoffs that depend on the players' actions and an unknown payoff-relevant state, and signals on the state that follow a Gaussian distribution conditional on the state realization. An information designer decides the fidelity of information revealed to the players in order to maximize the social welfare of the players or reduce the disagreement among players' actions. Leveraging the semi-definiteness of the information design problem, we derive analytical solutions for these objectives under specific LQG games. We show that full information disclosure maximizes social welfare when there is a common payoff-relevant state, when there is strategic substitutability in the actions of players, or when the signals are public. Numerical results show that as strategic substitution increases, the value of the information disclosure increases. When the objective is to induce conformity among players' actions, hiding information is optimal. Lastly, we consider the information design objective that is a weighted combination of social welfare and cohesiveness of players' actions. We obtain an interval for the weights where full information disclosure is optimal under public signals for games with strategic substitutability. Numerical solutions show that the actual interval where full information disclosure is optimal gets close to the analytical interval obtained as substitution increases.

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Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

Social Welfare Maximization and Conformism via Information Design in Linear-Quadratic-Gaussian Games

Sezer¹,

Khazaei²,

Eksin³

2021

Preprint

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“…For example, in [10], the authors considered infinite-dimensional linear control systems where the system "matrices" (more precisely, operators on L 2 ([0, 1], R)) are derived from graphons, and investigated the associated controllability properties and finite-dimensional approximations. We also mention [11,14] where the authors introduced different types of graphon games; broadly speaking, these are the games that comprise a continuum of agents and for which the relations between these agents are described by a graphon. They then proceeded to investigate, among others, the existence of Nash equilibria and properties of finite-dimensional approximations.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In the above mentioned works [10,11,14], graphons were treated as infinitedimensional extensions of finite dimensional adjacency matrices. We take a different point of view in this paper: we treat graphons as stochastic models for sampling large graphs.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The H-property of Line Graphons

Belabbas¹,

Chen²,

Başar³

2022

Preprint

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We explore in this paper sufficient conditions for the H-property to hold, with a particular focus on the so-called line graphons. A graphon is a symmetric, measurable function from the unit square [0, 1] 2 to the closed interval [0, 1]. Graphons can be used to sample random graphs, and a graphon is said to have the H-property if graphs on n nodes sampled from it admit a node-cover by disjoint cycles-such a cover is called a Hamiltonian decomposition-almost surely as n → ∞. A step-graphon is a graphon which is piecewise constant over rectangles in the domain. To a step-graphon, we assign two objects: its concentration vector, encoding the areas of the rectangles, and its skeletongraph, describing their supports. These two objects were used in [3] to establish necessary conditions for a step-graphon to have the H-property. In this paper, we prove that these conditions are essentially also sufficient for the class of line-graphons, i.e., the step-graphons whose skeleton graphs are line graphs with a self-loop at an ending node. We also investigate borderline cases where neither the necessary nor the sufficient conditions are met.

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“…The increasing interest in game-theoretic models for multiagent and network systems makes it relevant and timely to address the robustness issues above in the framework of network games [20]- [24]. These are strategic games whose players are identified with the nodes of a graph and have utilities that depend on their own and their neighbors' actions.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Robust Coordination of Linear Threshold Dynamics on Directed Weighted Networks

Arditti¹,

Como²,

Fagnani³

et al. 2021

Preprint

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We study the robustness of binary-action heterogeneous network coordination games equipped with an external field modeling the different players' biases towards one action with respect to the other one. We prove necessary and sufficient conditions for global stability of consensus equilibria under best response type dynamics, robustly with respect to (constant or time-varying) values of the external field. We then apply these results to the analysis of mixed network coordination and anticoordination games and find sufficient conditions for existence and global stability of pure strategy Nash equilibria. Our results apply to general weighted directed interaction networks and build on supermodularity properties of the coordination games in order to characterize conditions for the existence of a novel notion of robust improvement and best response paths.

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Analysis and Interventions in Large Network Games

Cited by 29 publications

References 153 publications

Social Welfare Maximization and Conformism via Information Design in Linear-Quadratic-Gaussian Games

Social Welfare Maximization and Conformism via Information Design in Linear-Quadratic-Gaussian Games

The H-property of Line Graphons

Robust Coordination of Linear Threshold Dynamics on Directed Weighted Networks

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