Analyzing circuit vulnerability to hardware Trojan insertion at the behavioral level

Salmani, Hassan; Tehranipoor, Mohammad

doi:10.1109/dft.2013.6653605

Cited by 65 publications

(20 citation statements)

References 15 publications

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“…A malicious 3PIP can use such features to create a behavioral Trojan that is difficult to trigger and whose effects cannot be observed at the outputs on regular functional testing. In order to quantify such vulnerabilities, we have proposed two broad metrics [20]: -Statement Hardness: This metric analyzes the rarity of the conditions under which a statement executes in RTL code. This metric is quantified by (…”

Section: Vulnerability Analysis At the Rtl Levelmentioning

confidence: 99%

Benchmarking of Hardware Trojans and Maliciously Affected Circuits

et al. 2017

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Research in the field of hardware Trojans has seen significant growth in the past decade. However, standard benchmarks to evaluate hardware Trojans and their detection are lacking. To this end, we have developed a suite of Trojans and 'trust benchmarks' (i.e., benchmark circuits with a hardware Trojan inserted in them) that can be used by researchers in the community to compare and contrast various Trojan detection techniques. In this paper, we present a comprehensive vulnerability analysis flow at various levels of abstraction of digital-design, that has been utilized to create these trust benchmarks. Further, we present a detailed evaluation of our benchmarks in terms of metrics such as Trojan detectability, and in the context of different attack

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Section: Vulnerability Analysis At the Rtl Levelmentioning

confidence: 99%

Benchmarking of Hardware Trojans and Maliciously Affected Circuits

et al. 2017

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“…Request permissions from Permissions@acm.org. DAC ' Alternately, an SoC integrator may automatically analyze the 3PIP code and mark suspicious signals using controllability and reachability values of signals [7]. FANCI marks gates with low activation probability as suspicious [8].…”

Section: Previous Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Detecting malicious modifications of data in third-party intellectual property cores

Rajendran

Vedula²,

Karri

2015

Proceedings of the 52nd Annual Design Automation Conference

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Globalization of the system-on-chip (SoC) design flow has created opportunities for rogue elements in the intellectual property (IP) vendor companies to insert malicious circuits (a.k.a. hardware Trojans) into their IPs. We propose to formally verify third party IPs (3PIPs) for unauthorized corruption of critical data such as secret key. Our approach develops properties to identify corruption of critical registers. Furthermore, we describe two attacks where computations can be performed on corrupted data without corrupting the critical register. We develop additional properties to detect such attacks. We validate our technique using Trojans in 8051 and RISC processors and AES designs from Trust-Hub.

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“…Alternately, an SoC integrator may automatically analyze the 3PIP code and mark suspicious signals using the controllability and reachability analysis [19]. Functional Analysis for Nearly-unused Circuit Identification (FANCI) marks gates with low activation probability as suspicious [20].…”

Section: B Previous Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Building Trustworthy Systems Using Untrusted Components: A High-Level Synthesis Approach

Rajendran

Sinanoglu

Karri

2016

IEEE Trans. VLSI Syst.

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Trustworthiness of system-on-chip designs is undermined by malicious logic (Trojans) in third-party intellectual properties (3PIPs). In this paper, duplication, diversity, and isolation principles have been extended to detect build trustworthy systems using untrusted, potentially Trojan-infected 3PIPs. We use a diverse set of vendors to prevent collusions between the 3PIPs from the same vendor. We identify design constraints for Trojan detection to achieving detection, collusion prevention, and isolating the Trojan-infected 3PIP, and incorporate them during high-level synthesis. In addition, we develop techniques to reduce the number of vendors. The effectiveness of the proposed techniques is validated using the high-level synthesis benchmarks.

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Analyzing circuit vulnerability to hardware Trojan insertion at the behavioral level

Cited by 65 publications

References 15 publications

Benchmarking of Hardware Trojans and Maliciously Affected Circuits

Benchmarking of Hardware Trojans and Maliciously Affected Circuits

Detecting malicious modifications of data in third-party intellectual property cores

Building Trustworthy Systems Using Untrusted Components: A High-Level Synthesis Approach

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