Animal Cognition

Andrews, Kristin; Radenovic, Ljiljana

doi:10.1002/9781444367072.wbiee050

Cited by 6 publications

(10 citation statements)

References 41 publications

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“…For instance, as philosopher of cognitive science Kristin Andrews describes it in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry on the subject, ‘animal cognition is constituted by the processes used to generate … flexible behaviour in animal species' [1]. Yet, by building behavioural outputs into the definition of cognition, the link between behavioural flexibility and particular cognitive mechanisms is established by definition.…”

Section: Problems Of Concept and Evidencementioning

confidence: 99%

“…In the ‘simplicity programme’ that is widely (though not universally) embraced in comparative cognition, putatively simpler hypotheses are treated as theoretical defaults that experiments must be able to exclude before more complex cognitive hypotheses can be accepted. In other words, explanations positing putatively simpler cognitive mechanisms should, all else being equal, be preferred over explanations that posit putatively more complex ones—an idea that is embraced in both comparative cognition [1,33] and in the psychological sciences more broadly [34]. This a priori preference for simplicity ‘resolves’ the problem of underdetermination by offering a clear strategy for choosing among empirically adequate hypotheses—one that places the burden of proof on the supposedly more complex hypothesis.…”

Section: Underdetermination and The Simplicity Programmementioning

confidence: 99%

“…According to the standard view in comparative cognition science, animal cognition is generally held to consist in the processes that generate flexible adaptive behaviours in animals [1]. This conception of cognition is motivated by the prima facie plausible assumption that flexible behaviour is underwritten by cognitive processes, and that the more flexible the observed behaviour, the more complex the cognitive processes that underlie it are likely to be (e.g.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Is behavioural flexibility evidence of cognitive complexity? How evolution can inform comparative cognition

2017

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Behavioural flexibility is often treated as the gold standard of evidence for more sophisticated or complex forms of animal cognition, such as planning, metacognition and mindreading. However, the evidential link between behavioural flexibility and complex cognition has not been explicitly or systematically defended. Such a defence is particularly pressing because observed flexible behaviours can frequently be explained by putatively simpler cognitive mechanisms. This leaves complex cognition hypotheses open to ‘deflationary’ challenges that are accorded greater evidential weight precisely because they offer putatively simpler explanations of equal explanatory power. This paper challenges the blanket preference for simpler explanations, and shows that once this preference is dispensed with, and the full spectrum of evidence—including evolutionary, ecological and phylogenetic data—is accorded its proper weight, an argument in support of the prevailing assumption that behavioural flexibility can serve as evidence for complex cognitive mechanisms may begin to take shape. An adaptive model of cognitive-behavioural evolution is proposed, according to which the existence of convergent trait–environment clusters in phylogenetically disparate lineages may serve as evidence for the same trait–environment clusters in other lineages. This, in turn, could permit inferences of cognitive complexity in cases of experimental underdetermination, thereby placing the common view that behavioural flexibility can serve as evidence for complex cognition on firmer grounds.

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Section: Problems Of Concept and Evidencementioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Underdetermination and The Simplicity Programmementioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Is behavioural flexibility evidence of cognitive complexity? How evolution can inform comparative cognition

2017

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“…An affective state acts as an antecedent that cues an emotion or mood, and because of this, the same nonconceptual content can be conceptual. An affective state can be nonconceptual as a perceptual state or conceptual as part of an emotional state’s contents [ 38 ]. Affective states and emotions demarcate a layer that acts as a gateway to conceptual mental content: conceptual thoughts and conceptual memories as propagating events.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

A unifying theory of physics and biological information through consciousness

Pollard-Wright¹

2021

Communicative & Integrative Biology

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This article represents a transdisciplinary theory that attempts, in a nonmathematical way, to reconcile some contemporary concepts of physics with a novel theory of the mind. It represents a thought experiment that consolidates complexity by melding certain unifying natural science concepts into a coherent reality. The foundations of quantum mechanics and the cosmological mysteries of dark energy, dark matter, and normal matter non-dogmatically explained may be accessible to individuals other than those immersed in mathematical formulas. Through reasoning and models, terms are defined and illustrations provided, further clarifying concepts. In this theory, consciousness represents dynamic differences that come to an end. It exists through interdependent relationships between dark energy, focal points of dark matter (FPDMs), and normal matter with associated states of mind: pure awareness, pure mental state, and mental images state, respectively. Consciousness enables the emergence of an observing ego, a viewpoint that defines conscious events but which is not consciousness in and of itself. For topics described throughout the article, there is a mental and physical aspect that through relationship produces change that makes a difference. In this way, the reader, an 'observing ego,' with a human cognitive viewpoint, may bridge the 'gap' connecting the mental and physical domains. Although the theory can be developed mathematically in more detail, the main emphasis is to provide an intriguing explanation of how physics melds with 'mind,' thus laying the foundation for future explorations into how this theoretical framework of the mind reciprocates with other areas of science.

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“…Many philosophers are skeptical about the application of psychological concepts to nonhuman animals. 1 On the other hand, as Andrews (2016) notes, "the cognitive scientists studying animals largely accept that animals are minded, cognitive systems" (p. 1). A standard response from philosophers, to the attribution of cognitive capabilities to animals, is to argue that the application of a term like 'belief' is not appropriate given a proper understanding of what belief really is.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

What Frege asked Alex the parrot: inferentialism, number concepts, and animal cognition

Nelson

2019

Philosophical Psychology

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While there has been significant philosophical debate on whether nonlinguistic animals can possess conceptual capabilities, less time has been devoted to considering 'talking' animals, such as parrots. When they are discussed, their capabilities are often downplayed as mere mimicry. The most explicit philosophical example of this can be seen in Brandom's frequent comparisons of parrots and thermostats. Brandom argues that because parrots (like thermostats) cannot grasp the implicit inferential connections between concepts, their vocal articulations do not actually have any conceptual content. In contrast, I argue that Pepperberg's work with Alex (and other African grey parrots) provides evidence that the vocal articulations of at least some parrots have conceptual content. Using Frege's insight that numbers assert something about a concept, I argue that Alex's ability to answer the question "How many?" depended upon a prior grasp of conceptual content. Developing this claim, I argue that Alex's arithmetical abilities show that he was capable of using numbers as both concepts and objects. Frege's theoretical insight and Pepperberg's empirical work provide reason to reconsider the capabilities of parrots, as well as what sorts of tasks provide evidence for conceptual content.

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Animal Cognition

Abstract: Debates in applied ethics about the proper treatment of animals often refer to empirical data about animal cognition, emotion, and behavior. In addition, there is increasing interest in the question of whether any nonhuman animal could be something like a moral agent.

Cited by 6 publications

References 41 publications

Is behavioural flexibility evidence of cognitive complexity? How evolution can inform comparative cognition

Is behavioural flexibility evidence of cognitive complexity? How evolution can inform comparative cognition

A unifying theory of physics and biological information through consciousness

What Frege asked Alex the parrot: inferentialism, number concepts, and animal cognition

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