Applying Thermal Side-Channel Attacks on Asymmetric Cryptography

Aljuffri, Abdullah; Zwalua, Marc; Reinbrecht, Cezar; Hamdioui, Said; Taouil, Mottaqiallah

doi:10.1109/tvlsi.2021.3111407

Cited by 13 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 28 publications

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“….0 is integrated as the power model. McPAT is an integrated power, area, and timing modelling framework for multithreaded, and many-core/multi-core architectures [48]. This analysis has been done in order to thwart the covert thermal channel attack of our targeted device.…”

Section: Experimental Evaluationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Selective Noise Based Power-Efficient and Effective Countermeasure against Thermal Covert Channel Attacks in Multi-Core Systems

Rahimi

Singh

Wang

2022

JLPEA

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With increasing interest in multi-core systems, such as any communication systems, infra-structures can become targets for information leakages via covert channel communication. Covert channel attacks lead to leaking secret information and data. To design countermeasures against these threats, we need to have good knowledge about classes of covert channel attacks along with their properties. Temperature–based covert communication channel, known as Thermal Covert Channel (TCC), can pose a threat to the security of critical information and data. In this paper, we present a novel scheme against such TCC attacks. The scheme adds selective noise to the thermal signal so that any possible TCC attack can be wiped out. The noise addition only happens at instances when there are chances of correct information exchange to increase the bit error rate (BER) and keep the power consumption low. Our experiments have illustrated that the BER of a TCC attack can increase to 94% while having similar power consumption as that of state-of-the-art

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Section: Experimental Evaluationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Selective Noise Based Power-Efficient and Effective Countermeasure against Thermal Covert Channel Attacks in Multi-Core Systems

Rahimi

Singh

Wang

2022

JLPEA

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“…These devices protect valuable information within them through encryption operations, enhancing the security of data. However, during the encryption process, devices inevitably generate information such as electromagnetic radiation [1], power consumption [2], heat [3], and timing [4]. Attackers can exploit side-channel analysis techniques to extract relevant and valuable information associated with the encryption process, posing a threat to the security of the devices.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Data Augmentation Method for Side-Channel Attacks on Cryptographic Integrated Circuits

Cui,

Zhang,

et al. 2024

Electronics

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The leaked signals, including electromagnetic, power, timing, and temperature generated during the operation of cryptographic devices, contain highly correlated key value information, leading to security vulnerabilities. In practical operations, due to information collection conditions and time limitations, attackers can only obtain limited valid data. At the same time, the attacker’s data environment cannot be ideal, and noise can affect the acquisition of valid information. Therefore, to improve the effectiveness of obtaining key values from side-channel information analysis in cryptographic devices, we proposed a data augmentation method based on cycle-consistent generative adversarial networks named EME-CycleGAN. By using generators and discriminators, new data are generated to expand the original electromagnetic information dataset, aiming for better modeling effects. For evaluating the data augmentation effect on side-channel electromagnetic signals, we employed the Kolmogorov–Smirnov test to characterize the original and generated data, serving as the evaluation standard for our network model and work. We utilize the existing data to model and verify side-channel attacks, evaluating the impact of the generated information on the overall experimental results. The proposed structure consists of three main parts: side-channel information acquisition, data verification analysis, and determination of attack positions. Experimental results demonstrate that effective attacks on encryption algorithms can be achieved under small-sample dataset conditions.

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“…of a device during normal operation, rather than exploiting a flaw in the design/hardware such as covert channels [ 12 , 13 , 14 , 15 , 16 , 17 ]. Side-channels typically leak cryptographic information, while covert channels are more general because there is an intentional transmission of data [ 18 , 19 , 20 , 21 ]. Some covert channels can operate remotely without the need for physical access or modification.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Covert Channel Communication as an Emerging Security Threat in 2.5D/3D Integrated Systems

Miketic

Dhananjay

Salman

2023

Sensors

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In this paper, first, a broad overview of existing covert channel communication-based security attacks is provided. Such covert channels establish a communication link between two entities that are not authorized to share data. The secret data is encoded into different forms of signals, such as delay, temperature, or hard drive location. These signals and information are then decoded by the receiver to retrieve the secret data, thereby mitigating some of the existing security measures. The important steps of covert channel attacks are described, such as data encoding, communication protocol, data decoding, and models to estimate communication bandwidth and bit error rate. Countermeasures against covert channels and existing covert channel detection techniques are also summarized. In the second part of the paper, the implications of such attacks for emerging packaging technologies, such as 2.5D/3D integration are discussed. Several covert channel threat models for 2.5D/3D ICs are also proposed.

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Applying Thermal Side-Channel Attacks on Asymmetric Cryptography

Cited by 13 publications

References 28 publications

Selective Noise Based Power-Efficient and Effective Countermeasure against Thermal Covert Channel Attacks in Multi-Core Systems

Selective Noise Based Power-Efficient and Effective Countermeasure against Thermal Covert Channel Attacks in Multi-Core Systems

A Data Augmentation Method for Side-Channel Attacks on Cryptographic Integrated Circuits

Covert Channel Communication as an Emerging Security Threat in 2.5D/3D Integrated Systems

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