Are Moral Requirements Hypothetical Imperatives?

McDowell, John; McFetridge, I. G.

doi:10.1093/aristoteliansupp/52.1.13

Cited by 418 publications

(111 citation statements)

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“…Despite the fact that a number of philosophers advocate anti-Humeanism (e.g. Nagel, 1970;McDowell, 1978;McNaughton, 1988;Shafer-Landau, 2003), I think there are persuasive reasons to doubt that this theory represents a correct view about moral motivation. Recall that the examination of pain asymbolia revealed that pain asymbolics are able to form true beliefs about the pain they feel, but do not have any desire whatsoever to diminish that pain.…”

Section: Premise (3): Motivation Requires Suitable Belief-desire Compmentioning

confidence: 94%

The argument from moral psychology

Milevski¹

2015

Belgr Philosop Ann

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Section: Premise (3): Motivation Requires Suitable Belief-desire Compmentioning

confidence: 94%

The argument from moral psychology

Milevski¹

2015

Belgr Philosop Ann

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“…41 For discussion, both pro and con, see: (Altham 1986), (McNaughton 1991), (Smith 1994), (Little 1997), (Jacobson-Horowitz 2006), and (Tenenbaum 2006). 42 For discussion see (Nagel 1970), (McDowell 1978, 1979), and (Dancy 1993, 2003. 43 See (Dancy 1993(Dancy , 2003.…”

Section: Intuition In Actionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Rational Roles of Intuition

Chudnoff¹

2014

Intuitions

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Intuitions are often thought of as inputs to theoretical reasoning. For example, you might form a belief by taking an intuition at face value, or you might take your intuitions as starting points in the method of reflective equilibrium. The aim of this paper is to argue that in addition to these roles intuitions also play action--guiding roles. The argument proceeds by reflection on the transmission of justification through inference. According to inferential internalists, in order to gain justification for believing the conclusion of an argument by inferring it from the premises in that argument one must "see" that the premises support the conclusion. 2 We have attitudes-beliefs, desires, hopes, fears, intentions-and we perform actions-mental ones such as counting sheep before falling asleep and bodily ones such as making the bed after waking up. Some of these attitudes and actions are more reasonable than others. We have experiences, such as perceptions, bodily sensations, recollections, imaginings, and-I would add-intuitions. Some of these play roles in making some of our attitudes and actions more reasonable than others. By the rational roles of a type of experience I mean the roles experiences of that type play in making some of our attitudes and actions more reasonable than others.In this paper I will explore the rational roles intuitions play. Two have been discussed widely recently:Justifier: Intuitions justify beliefs.Evidence: Intuitions are evidence for beliefs.

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“…Hence the need for EC. And even if the agent's motivating reason involves a desire as a real existence, it could still happen that as a mental state desire cannot be pried apart frombecause it is identical with or is entailed by -a belief with which it together comprises the agent's motivating reason (McDowell 1978(McDowell , 1979. Hence the need for IC.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…3 This is deliberately metaphorical since it is an unresolved debate how one cashes out the different roles desire and belief play in motivation on HTM. 4 Dancy's main cognitivist targets are pure ascriptivism (Nagel 1970: 29-30), motivated desires (Nagel 1970: 29), and besires (McDowell 1978(McDowell , 1979McNaughton 1988: Chap. 7;Phillips 1977).…”

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confidence: 99%

Pure Cognitivism and Beyond

Tanyi

2013

Acta Anal

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The problem of motivation has always been among the favorite topics of philosophers. This is understandable: we want to know why we do the things we do. Moreover, we also want to know what counts as (intentional) action, and motivation, it is natural to suppose, is intimately related to action. And if some kind of motivational internalism is true, that is, if there is an intimate connection between ethical statements or truths and Acta Anal (2014) Author's personal copy motivation, then our views about motivation will determine, or at least influence, the sort of meta-ethical theory we endorse. Of course, these connections must be worked out in detail, and this can prove to be -as often in philosophy -an arduous exercise. Still, details and difficulties notwithstanding, these points well indicate how important the question of motivation is for philosophy.

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Are Moral Requirements Hypothetical Imperatives?

Cited by 418 publications

References 0 publications

The argument from moral psychology

The argument from moral psychology

The Rational Roles of Intuition

Pure Cognitivism and Beyond

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