Are smart sanctions smart enough? An inquiry into when leaders oppress civilians under UN targeted sanctions

Park, Jiyoun; Choi, Hyun Jin

doi:10.1177/0192512120931957

Cited by 16 publications

(7 citation statements)

References 34 publications

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“…A statistical analysis across 56 episodes of sanctions including travel bans, asset freezes, and arms embargoes suggests that if sanctions are broad, either in the number of people or the types of activities targeted, they increase the likelihood of individual elites becoming targets themselves, which gives them an incentive to create or join an opposition movement, which in turn incentivises leaders to increase oppression to protect their positions. The study also finds that as sanctions become increasingly effective in cutting off access to resources, they limit leaders' power to carry out oppression, and that sanctions are more likely to have adverse impacts on human rights in non-democratic regimes with small winning coalitions than in democratic regimes (Park & Choi, 2020).…”

Section: Impacts On Civiliansmentioning

confidence: 91%

Imposing Sanctions on Individuals

Lucas¹

2022

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There is consensus in the literature that individual and targeted sanctions have little power to coerce targets to make significant policy changes, and that they are less successful in achieving their overall goals than conventional broad-based sanctions. There is some evidence suggesting that the more narrowly targeted sanctions are, the less impact they have. However, individual and targeted sanctions can help constrain their targets’ access to resources and ability to carry out policies, particularly when sanctions are used in combination with other measures. There is some evidence that sanctions against non-state actors may be less effective than sanctions against state-connected actors, but it is difficult to measure these impacts because these groups operate clandestinely.

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Section: Impacts On Civiliansmentioning

confidence: 91%

Imposing Sanctions on Individuals

Lucas¹

2022

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“…In addition, targeted measures could decrease support for those targeted among elites that constitute the power base of rulers. This notion found some elaboration among scholars positing that targeted sanctions are better suited to pressure regime supporters than general embargoes (Kirshner, 1997), weakening autocrats who relied on a small elite or "selectorate" (Brooks, 2002;Park & Choi, 2020).…”

Section: Re-inventing the Tool: The Rationale Of Targeted Sanctionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Design and Impacts of Individual Sanctions: Evidence From Elites in Côte d’Ivoire and Zimbabwe

Portela

Laer²

2022

PaG

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Since the 1990s, sanctions senders like the European Union, the United States, and the United Nations have been imposing visa bans and asset freezes on individuals as a key element of their sanctions packages. Notwithstanding the growing centrality that individual sanctions have acquired in international sanctions practice, little is known about the impact of sanctions listings on designees. Some researchers have scrutinised targeting choices, while others have explored the effects of sanctions on designees. However, no study has yet examined the fit between targeting choices and impacts on designees. First, we interrogate the theory of targeted sanctions to identify the expectations that it generates. Second, we examine the effects on designees and contrast them with the targeting logic of the sender, in a bid to ascertain their fit. Our analysis of the cases of Côte d’Ivoire (2010–2011) and Zimbabwe (2002–2017) benefits from original interview material.

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“…14 In this regard, even targeted economic sanctions designed to selectively affect the ruling elites, end up hurting primarily broad population. See, (Tostensen, Bull 2002;Peksen 2009;Drezner 2011;Escribà-Folch 2012;Targeted sanctions 2016;Park, Choi 2022).…”

Section: Escalatory Risks Of Foreign Interferencementioning

confidence: 99%

Military Deterrence vs Foreign Interference? Record of the Cold War

Istomin

2022

Vestnik MGIMO-universiteta

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Academic literature is largely skeptical regarding the role of military deterrence in addressing low-level coercion. The stability-instability paradox suggests that increasing destructiveness of the armed forces (especially with the emergence of nuclear weapons) diminishes their utility in response to limited wars, proxy conflicts or economic sanctions. Recent debates often extend the same logic to foreign interference in internal affairs, as they position it as a supplement for forcible rivalries. This article seeks to advance understanding of the linkage between military deterrence and foreign interference in internal politics by exploring the record of the early Cold War starting from 1948 to the mid-1950s. The analysis attests that concern over the Soviet military capabilities had a major restraining effect on Washington. As a result, the US pursued more cautious activities against the Soviet Union in comparison to the campaigns targeting less capable states. This historical record reveals that interference is more amenable to military deterrence than other types of low-level coercion. It differs from them, as covert operations produce an existential danger to the political leaders of a target state, inciting overreaction on their behalf. Therefore, they create escalation risks when threatening a great power. Interference exacerbates confrontation even between adversaries that perceived each other as malign beforehand. Apart from signaling hostile intentions, it aggravates a sense of urgency on finding a response. Although military capabilities do not provide a direct solution to political threats, they serve as a repellent against potential subversive activities. These conclusions do not depend on the specific type of interference pursued by external agents. The findings of the article demonstrate that cross-domain deterrence is more prevalent than stability-instability paradox envisages.

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Are smart sanctions smart enough? An inquiry into when leaders oppress civilians under UN targeted sanctions

Cited by 16 publications

References 34 publications

Imposing Sanctions on Individuals

Imposing Sanctions on Individuals

The Design and Impacts of Individual Sanctions: Evidence From Elites in Côte d’Ivoire and Zimbabwe

Military Deterrence vs Foreign Interference? Record of the Cold War

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