HighlightsAcross Africa, conflict increases the price of commodities, which, in turn, increase the rate of political violence.Climate change has a weak direct effect on political violence rates.Climate change indirectly affects conflict rates through the effect of increased food prices.Governments and stable markets play a key role in mitigating the negative effects of climate change.Studies of how climate change will affect social, economic and political conditions should be conducted on the local level.

This study explores the multifaceted calculus behind engagement in protests using data from 45 countries in the World Values Survey Wave 6 (2010–2014), employing a hierarchical linear model. It expands the current scholarship on protest politics by investigating how individual subjective assessment and evaluation of income inequality, and redistributive preferences influence participation in protests. We found that protest is a powerful outlet used by highly educated citizens with strong grievances about economic inequality, and labor union networks, especially in advanced industrialized countries. The empirical analysis further reveals that the salience of redistributive preferences may effectively filter individual responses and become channeled into action in protests in a broader sample. Moreover, we show that the impact of grievances about inequality on protest becomes significant when government social spending is increased and the level of inequality is high. Conversely, conventional macro-level indicators on their own, such as the Gini coefficient of income disparity and social spending, did not explain variance in protest participation. Findings suggest that more systematic research is necessary to detect the precise mechanisms at play that link grievances about inequality and the exponential expansion of protest politics.

This article extends the formal logic of Stathis Kalyvas' theory of selective violence to account for three political actors with asymmetric capabilities. In contrast to Kalyvas' theory, the authors' computer simulation suggests that (1) selective violence by the stronger actor will be concentrated in areas where weaker actors exercise control; (2) the relative level of selective violence used by weaker actors will be lower because of a reduced capacity to induce civilian collaboration; and (3) areas of parity among the three actors will exhibit low levels of selective violence perpetrated primarily by the strongest actor. Results from a logistic regression, using empirical data on Israel and two rival Palestinian factions from 2006 to 2008, are consistent with these predictions: Israel was more likely to use selective violence in areas largely controlled by Palestinian factions; zones of incomplete Israeli control were not prone to selective violence; and zones of mixed control witnessed moderate levels of selective violence, mainly by Israel. Nonetheless, Palestinian violence remained consistent with Kalyvas' predictions.

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