Coup, riot, war: How political institutions and ethnic politics shape alternative forms of political violence

Are smart sanctions smart enough? An inquiry into when leaders oppress civilians under UN targeted sanctions

“…Furthermore, this makes members of the incumbent's coalition 'loyal' to their present leader for fear of losing access to future benefits (Bueno de Mesquita et al, 2003). However, substantial decreases in private benefits-through economic sanctions, financial crisis, or foreign aid shocks, for example-reduce both the welfare and loyalty of regime elites, emboldening some in the leader's coalition to challenge the incumbent (Choi and Kim, 2018;Nielsen et al, 2011). When non-democratic leaders begin to lose power, they are more likely to do so through a coup, a revolt, or an assassination (Geddes et al, 2018: 178-180).…”

Ethnic Exclusion, Armed Conflict, and Leader Survival

“…However, the proposed theory suggests that such a policy is not necessarily a rational one, at least for the leader if not the citizenry. The promotion of an inclusive coalition in small-W systems gives rise to oversized coalition, making the leader vulnerable to a violent removal from office (Choi and Kim 2016). In particular, when members of one ethnic group have enjoyed exclusive privileges for a long period of time before this policy is implemented, they are unlikely to relinquish their privileges without a bloody fight.…”

“…More recently, Choi and Kim (2016) suggest that excluded groups are most likely to rebel against the government in autocratic systems with small ruling coalitions. Because such regimes provide little opportunity to replace the incumbent through nonviolent means, excluded ethnic groups may come to perceive armed rebellion as a necessary strategy to overthrow the present regime.…”

“…They can carry out a coup d'état, revolt, or assassination 8 Examples of oversized regimes include Iraq 1958-1963, 2003, Burundi 1989-1993, Rwanda 1989-1994, and Afghanistan 2002-2010, while examples of undersized regimes include Mozambique 1995, Bolivia 1982-2005, Sri Lanka 1956-1963, and Zimbabwe 1970-1978. For more details on this typology, see Choi and Kim (2016).…”

Ethnic Fractionalization, Corruption, and Trust in the Courts

“…Though outside of the scope of this article, some research suggests that group size can affect economic development, civil conflict, changes in policy preferences, and political participation (Choi and Kim, 2018;Dimico, 2017;Leighley and Vedlitz, 1999;Wimmer et al, 2009). This line of research is beyond the study of judicial institutions.…”