Are there theory of mind regions in the brain? A review of the neuroimaging literature

Abstract

There have been many functional imaging studies of the brain basis of theory of mind (ToM) skills, but the findings are heterogeneous and implicate anatomical regions as far apart as orbitofrontal cortex and the inferior parietal lobe. The functional imaging studies are reviewed to determine whether the diverse findings are due to methodological factors. The studies are considered according to the paradigm employed (e.g., stories vs. cartoons and explicit vs. implicit ToM instructions), the mental state(s) investigated, and the language demands of the tasks. Methodological variability does not seem to account for the variation in findings, although this conclusion may partly reflect the relatively small number of studies. Alternatively, several distinct brain regions may be activated during ToM reasoning, forming an integrated functional "network." The imaging findings suggest that there are several "core" regions in the network-including parts of the prefrontal cortex and superior temporal sulcus-while several more "peripheral" regions may contribute to ToM reasoning in a manner contingent on relatively minor aspects of the ToM task.

Brain activity during the flow experience: A functional near-infrared spectroscopy study

“…In the current study, both the inferior frontal gyrus and the lateral orbitofrontal gyrus were included in the VLPFC. The lateral orbitofrontal gyrus is part of the orbitofrontal cortex and is involved in processing reward and emotions such as sympathy [22] and monitoring punishment, which is a self-evaluation process used to 15 analyze changes in ongoing behavior [13]. Activation of the R-and L-VLPFC during the experimental task under flow conditions may therefore suggest that these areas are involved in processing reward and emotion in a state of flow.…”

Hearing others’ pain: neural activity related to empathy

“…indicating a relationship to the extraction of emotional content from vocal stimuli (Zhang, Shu, Zhou, Wang, & Li, 2010). Moreover, the STG and MTG are typically engaged in cognitive empathy (Carrington & Bailey, 2009;Völlm et al, 2006). Also, greater involvement of the STG and MTG has been found in empathy studies using cuebased paradigms in which participants receive and observe stimuli related to pain in others (Lamm, Decety, & Singer, 2011).…”

The neural basis of conceptualizing the same action at different levels of abstraction

“…Specifically, the Why > How contrast reliably reveals activation in the dorsomedial and ventromedial prefrontal cortex (PFC), the anterior superior temporal sulcus (STS), the temporoparietal junction (TPJ) and the posterior cingulate cortex (PCC)-regions that have been independently implicated in representing and reasoning about the mental states that typically drive actions, such as beliefs, desires and intentions (Gallagher and Frith, 2003;Saxe, 2006;Carrington and Bailey, 2009;Van Overwalle and Baetens, 2009;Mar, 2011;Denny et al, 2012;Schurz et al, 2014). Conversely, the How > Why contrast reliably activates the dorsal and ventral premotor cortex (PMC), posterior middle temporal gyrus (MTG), rostral inferior parietal lobule (IPL) and dorsal precuneusregions that have been independently implicated in representing the visual motion patterns and somatomotor features of actions when perceived and performed (Caspers et al, 2010;Molenberghs et al, 2012;Rizzolatti et al, 2014), conceptualized (Kemmerer et al, 2012;Watson et al, 2013;Urgesi et al, 2014), and verbally processed (Kemmerer et al, 2012;Pulvermuller, 2013;Kemmerer, 2015).…”