The neural basis of conceptualizing the same action at different levels of abstraction

Abstract

People can conceptualize the same action (e.g. 'riding a bike') at different levels of abstraction (LOA), where higher LOAs specify the abstract motives that explain why the action is performed (e.g. 'getting exercise'), while lower LOAs specify the concrete steps that indicate how the action is performed (e.g. 'gripping handlebars'). Prior neuroimaging studies have shown that why and how questions about actions differentially activate two cortical networks associated with mental-state reasoning and action representation, respectively; however, it remains unknown whether this is due to the differential demands of the questions per se or to the shifts in LOA those questions produce. We conducted functional magnetic resonance imaging while participants judged pairs of action phrases that varied in LOA and that could be framed either as a why question (Why ride a bike? Get exercise.) or a how question (How to get exercise? Ride a bike.). Question framing (why vs how) had no effect on activity in regions of the two networks. Instead, these regions uniquely tracked parametric variation in LOA, both across and within trials. This suggests that the human capacity to understand actions at different LOA is based in the relative activity of two cortical networks.

Neural processing of social interaction: Coordinate‐based meta‐analytic evidence from human neuroimaging studies

“…Considerable evidence on the neural processing of individual actions has supported a functional segregation between the complementary roles of the action observation and mentalizing networks, driven by, respectively, (a) biological actions versus verbal/abstract information; (b) implicit versus explicit tasks; and (c) processing “what” and “how” a person is doing (behavioral states) versus “why” (mental states) (Chiavarino, & Humphreys, ; Spunt, Kemmerer, & Adolphs, ; Spunt & Lieberman, , ). However, this segregation conflicts with their joint activation when processing social interactions , regardless of stimuli type (Arioli et al, ; Centelles, Assaiante, Nazarian, Anton, & Schmitz, ; Iacoboni et al, ; Kujala, Carlson, & Hari, ).…”

“…and "how" a person is doing (behavioral states) versus "why" (mental states) (Chiavarino, & Humphreys, 2012;Spunt, Kemmerer, & Adolphs, 2016;Spunt & Lieberman, 2012a, 2012b. However, this segregation conflicts with their joint activation when processing social interactions, regardless of stimuli type Centelles, Assaiante, Nazarian, Anton, & Schmitz, 2011;Iacoboni et al, 2004;Kujala, Carlson, & Hari, 2012).…”

Specifying the brain anatomy underlying temporo-parietal junction activations for theory of mind: A review using probabilistic atlases from different imaging modalities

“…First, TPJ activations may not fall into a gyrus or several gyri, but alternatively (or additionally) in sulci such as the posterior Superior Temporal Sulcus (pSTS). In fact, both the labels TPJ [e.g., Saxe and Kanwisher, , Schaafsma et al, ; Spunt and Adolphs, ; Spunt et al, ] and pSTS [Carrington and Bailey, ; Frith and Frith, ; Lieberman, ; Singer, ] are highly popular for characterizing brain functions involved in social cognition and ToM. However, since most ToM research relied on volume‐based brain analyses and gyral parcellations, explicit distinctions between temporo‐parietal gyri and adjacent pSTS are rare [for a recent exception, see Deen et al, ].…”

Affective and cooperative social interactions modulate effective connectivity within and between the mirror and mentalizing systems

“…Even when inferences are drawn from action observation, however, the core regions of mirror and mentalizing systems are specifically recruited by identifying how (executed movements) versus why (beliefs and intentions) an action is performed (Spunt, Falk, & Lieberman, , Spunt, Satpute, & Lieberman, ; Spunt & Adolphs, ; Spunt & Lieberman, a, b). Decoding others’ actions at different levels of abstraction thus involves the relative activity of the mirror and mentalizing systems, processing what and how another person is doing (i.e., a behavioral state) versus why (i.e., a mental state) (Spunt, Kemmerer, & Adolphs, ; see also Chiavarino, Apperly, & Humphreys, ).…”