Aristotle On The Causes Of Akrasia

Destrée, Pierre

doi:10.1163/ej.9789004156708.i-308.39

Cited by 10 publications

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“…96 On this interpretation, having the right desire and having knowledge are intertwined states. This approach has prima facie appeal because it harmonizes Aristotle's view, on the one hand, that only the virtuous person truly desires the good, while others are deceived by the object of their 93 Moss (2009) and Destrée (2007) for the former, Charles (2007) the latter. 94 e.g.…”

Section: Section 4: Akrasiamentioning

confidence: 87%

“…I will then argue that akrasia has a double aspect: it is both an inability to abide by one's choice in the moment, as a result of faulty perception, and that this inability is ultimately caused by being in a state of passion. I will conclude by considering how the akratic character is developed, and I will argue that the 92 Destrée (2007) and Moss (2012) adopt similar strategies. Destrée justifies this move with Aristotle's invocation of the phusikos explanation at 1147a24 (p.148, 151). akratic is vulnerable to such states of passion because he has taken refuge in arguments concerning what is good rather than acting by their guidance, out of ambivalence about the sort of life he wants to lead.…”

Section: Section 4: Akrasiamentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Dahl (1984). 96 In this camp, see Destrée (2007), Charles (2007), and Moss (2009). desire, and his view, on the other, that acting well because one knows that it is the right thing to do does not make the act virtuous-one must be virtuous to do virtuous deeds.…”

Section: Section 4: Akrasiamentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In De anima III.9-11 Aristotle offers a single account of animal motion that explains the movement of both rational and non-rational animals, but 97 Moss (2009, revised and reprinted as chapter 5 in her 2012) argues persuasively for the compatibility of these two characterizations. Destrée (2007) similarly argues for the compatibility of the explanation of akrasia terms of a conflict of desire and the explanation from ignorance. 98 Though, as Moss (2009) points out, it is also clearly present in the Nic.…”

Section: Desire and The Desired In Animal Motionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…See chapter 1 for the argument that desire depends upon evaluative cognition, and chapter 2 for the distinction between rational and non-rational desires. So, similarly, doesDestrée (2007) pp. 150.…”

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confidence: 91%

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Perception in Aristotle's Ethics

Rabinoff¹

2018

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The project of this dissertation is to examine the role that perception plays in Aristotle's ethics. Aristotle is famous for offering what might be called a situational ethics: discerning what one ought to do is not derivable from universal laws, but must be assessed with respect to the particulars that make up the situation in which one must act.Aristotle argues that what virtue calls for is acting and feeling in an appropriate manner, i.e. at the right time, to the right degree, in the right manner, with respect to the right people, and so on (Nicomachean Ethics 1106b21-24). Moreover, because of the situational specificity of right action, one must also have the right character in order to discern what virtue calls for-only the virtuous person sees what is truly good. If one has a faulty character, the particulars will appear in a distorted manner, just as the wine tastes bitter to those who are ill (1113a25-29).It appears that a consequence of the situational specificity of virtuous action is that in order to be virtuous one must see rightly, in a literal sense. Aristotle is consistent in designating perception as the faculty that apprehends the particular (De anima 417b21- 29, Nic. Eth. 1109b23, 1113a1-2, 1126b4, 1142a27, 1143b6, 1147a27, 1147b18).Moreover, if those who are not virtuous cannot discern instances of virtuous action as virtuous (as a person who is ill cannot taste wine as sweet), this means that there is a limit to what the powers of intellect can accomplish with regard to virtuous action, for if virtue were simply a matter of understanding, whether one does or does not have the right character should not matter. Discerning virtuous action, then, seems to be a matter of perception.This consequence, however, carries some difficulties with it. In the first place, it appears to contradict the very definition of virtue as the excellent activity of the rational part of the soul. This suggests that it is not perception, a faculty of the non-rational part of the soul shared with animals, that discerns what is virtuous, but intellect and reason. In the second place, Aristotle conceives of perception as a bodily power in an important way: it is a power that operates through sense organs that are affected (physically) by the objects of sense. But it would be strange to consider goodness (or justice, or temperance, etc.) a physical object capable of affecting the sense organs and producing perception.Aristotle seems to be in a theoretical bind: perception is the faculty that discerns the particulars yet it is seemingly not equipped to discern ethical particulars.There are two ways one might get Aristotle out of this bind: one way is to give perception a merely instrumental role in the discernment of ethical particulars, where it is by the judgment of intellect upon the data provided by perception that one apprehends ethical particulars. If one adopts this strategy, one maintains that it is indeed the rational part of the soul that discerns virtuous action, but risks undermining the situational specificity ...

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Section: Section 4: Akrasiamentioning

confidence: 87%

Section: Section 4: Akrasiamentioning

confidence: 99%