Asymmetric interaction paired with a super-rational strategy might resolve the tragedy of the commons without requiring recognition or negotiation

Abstract

Avoiding the tragedy of the commons requires that one or more individuals in a group or partnership “volunteer”, benefiting the group at a cost to themselves. Recognition and negotiation with social partners can maintain cooperation, but are often not possible. If recognition and negotiation are not always the mechanism by which cooperative partnerships avoid collective tragedies, what might explain the diverse social cooperation observed in nature? Assuming that individuals interact asymmetrically and that both “weak” and “strong” players employ a super-rational strategy, we find that tragedy of the commons can be avoided without requiring either recognition or negotiation. Whereas in the volunteer's dilemma game a rational “strong” player is less likely to volunteer to provide a common good in larger groups, we show that under a wide range of conditions a super-rational “strong” player is more likely to provide a common good. These results imply that the integration of super-rationality and asymmetric interaction might have the potential to resolve the tragedy of the commons. By illuminating the conditions under which players are likely to volunteer, we shed light on the patterns of volunteerism observed in variety of well-studied cooperative social systems, and explore how societies might avert social tragedies.

Punitive preferences, monetary incentives and tacit coordination in the punishment of defectors promote cooperation in humans

“…In accordance with a conceptual framework of institutional emergence 28 and insights from game theoretic analyses 29 30 , we argue that individuals’ distinct ability to punish defectors may be key to explain the transition from peer-punishment to more centralized forms of punishment. In particular, we argue that in a state devoid of any norm enforcing institutions, social order will be maintained by the “strongest” individuals, who emerge as the “violence specialists” 28 in a group.…”

Aspiration-based coevolution of link weight promotes cooperation in the spatial prisoner's dilemma game

“…It creates an irreconcilable conflict between what is best for individual and what is best for group. In order to offset the above unfavourable outcome and enhance cooperation, many frameworks have been proposed, such as age [4][5][6], reputation [7][8][9][10][11], social diversity [12][13][14][15][16][17][18], asymmetric interaction [19][20][21][22], mobility [23][24][25][26][27][28], different update rules [29][30][31][32][33], as well as various network topologies [34][35][36][37], to name but a few [38][39][40][41][42][43][44].…”

Antisocial pool rewarding does not deter public cooperation

“…Despite favourable predispositions, however, cooperation is often subject to both positive and negative incentives [12][13][14][15][16]. Positive incentives typically entail rewards for behaving prosocially [17][18][19][20][21], while negative incentives typically entail punishing free-riding [22][23][24][25][26][27][28][29][30].…”