BAR fault tolerance for cooperative services

Aiyer, Amitanand S.; Alvisi, Lorenzo; Clement, Allen; Dahlin, Mike; Martin, Jean‐Philippe; Porth, Carl

doi:10.1145/1095810.1095816

Cited by 124 publications

(68 citation statements)

References 54 publications

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“…For example, if fewer than half the agents are corrupted, then we can easily do Byzantine agreement with a mediator: all the agents simply tell the mediator their preference, and the mediator chooses the majority. Another line of research was initiated by work on the BAR model [Aiyer, Alvisi, Clement, Dahlin, Martin, and Porth 2005]; see, for example, [Moscibroda, Schmid, and Wattenhofer 2006;Wong, Levy, Alvisi, Clement, and Dahlin 2011]. Like the work in [Abraham, Dolev, Gonen, and Halpern 2006;Abraham, Dolev, and Halpern 2008], the BAR model allows Byzantine (or faulty) players and rational players; in addition, it allows for acquiescent players, who follow the recommended protocols.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Distributed Protocols for Leader Election: A Game-Theoretic Perspective

Abraham

Dolev

Halpern

2013

Lecture Notes in Computer Science

133

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We do a game-theoretic analysis of leader election, under the assumption that each agent prefers to have some leader than to have no leader at all. We show that it is possible to obtain a fair Nash equilibrium, where each agent has an equal probability of being elected leader, in a completely connected network, in a bidirectional ring, and a unidirectional ring, in the synchronous setting. In the asynchronous setting, Nash equilibrium is not quite the right solution concept. Rather, we must consider ex post Nash equilibrium; this means that we have a Nash equilibrium no matter what a scheduling adversary does. We show that ex post Nash equilibrium is attainable in the asynchronous setting in all the networks we consider, using a protocol with bounded running time. However, in the asynchronous setting, we require that n > 2. We can get a fair -Nash equilibrium if n = 2 in the asynchronous setting, under some cryptographic assumptions (specifically, the existence of a pseudo-random number generator and polynomially-bounded agents), using ideas from bit-commitment protocols. We then generalize these results to a setting where we can have deviations by a coalition of size k. In this case, we can get what we call a fair k-resilient equilibrium if n > 2k; under the same cryptographic assumptions, we can a get a k-resilient equilibrium if n = 2k. Finally, we show that, under minimal assumptions, not only do our protocols give a Nash equilibrium, they also give a sequential equilibrium [Kreps and Wilson 1982], so players even play optimally off the equilibrium path.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Distributed Protocols for Leader Election: A Game-Theoretic Perspective

Abraham

Dolev

Halpern

2013

Lecture Notes in Computer Science

133

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“…2 Moreover, when discounting the cost of cryptography, which can be exchanged for a hardware level cryptographic accelerator card, we can obtain a throughput of between 40,000 and 50,000 messages per second (this was repeated with messages of sizes 1, 10, and 100 bytes). 3 These results are significantly higher than previously reported results for group communication systems. We were able to obtain these results due to a combination of new hardware (an IBM BladeCenter), fixing some legacy performance bugs of Ensemble, and the novel techniques that we used, as described briefly above, and elaborated on in the rest of this paper.…”

Section: Detailed Performance Evaluationcontrasting

confidence: 52%

“…The BAR (Byzantine, Altruist, Rational) framework was recently introduced in order to handle systems in which some nodes are Byzantine, some are rational, and the rest are altruist [3]. That is, Byzantine nodes can deviate arbitrarily from their protocol, rational nodes only deviate from the protocol is they can gain something by that, and altruists always obey the protocol.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…That is, Byzantine nodes can deviate arbitrarily from their protocol, rational nodes only deviate from the protocol is they can gain something by that, and altruists always obey the protocol. A generic set of services that accommodates this generalized failure model was also developed, as well as a specific collaborative storage service, nicknamed BAR-B [3]. The BAR model is more suitable for collaborative systems, in which services are hosted on the participants machines, and therefore it is likely that many of these nodes will only participate if they are given an incentive to do so.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Practical Byzantine Group Communication

Drabkin

Friedman

Kama

26th IEEE International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems (ICDCS'06)

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This paper presents an adaptation of a group communication system called JazzEnsemble to tolerate Byzantine failures. The work described here emphasizes scalability and good performance in the normal case, i.e., when there are no failures, while providing strong semantics to the application. The paper presents the main concepts and protocols that enable the Byzantine tolerant version of JazzEnsemble to obtain these goals. In particular, this includes fuzzy mute and fuzzy verbose failure detectors, an efficient Byzantine vector consensus protocol, and a novel Byzantine uniform broadcast protocol, as well as modifications at each layer of the system to overcome potential Byzantine attacks. Additionally, high-level protocols only rely on the oral messages model, and thus messages need to be signed only once at a low level of the system. Finally, the paper presents an extensive performance evaluation, which demonstrates the system's scalability and efficiency. This is also used to analyze the sources of performance degradation associated with various aspects of overcoming Byzantine failures.

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“…In addition to addressing the need to reduce the total payments made by agents to the bank, one issue for future work relates to the need to provide robustness when faced with adversarial or faulty agents: the current solution is fragile in this sense, with its equilibrium properties relying on other agents following the protocol. Some papers (Lysyanskaya & Triandopoulos, 2006;Aiyer, Alvisi, Clement, Dahlin, Martin, & Porth, 2005;Shneidman & Parkes, 2003) provide robustness to mixture models (e.g. some rational, some adversarial) but we are not aware of any work with these mixture models in the context of efficient social choice.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

M-DPOP: Faithful Distributed Implementation of Efficient Social Choice Problems

Petcu¹,

Faltings²,

Parkes³

2008

jair

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In the efficient social choice problem, the goal is to assign values, subject to side constraints, to a set of variables to maximize the total utility across a population of agents, where each agent has private information about its utility function. In this paper we model the social choice problem as a distributed constraint optimization problem (DCOP), in which each agent can communicate with other agents that share an interest in one or more variables. Whereas existing DCOP algorithms can be easily manipulated by an agent, either by misreporting private information or deviating from the algorithm, we introduce M-DPOP, the first DCOP algorithm that provides a faithful distributed implementation for efficient social choice. This provides a concrete example of how the methods of mechanism design can be unified with those of distributed optimization. Faithfulness ensures that no agent can benefit by unilaterally deviating from any aspect of the protocol, neither informationrevelation, computation, nor communication, and whatever the private information of other agents. We allow for payments by agents to a central bank, which is the only central authority that we require. To achieve faithfulness, we carefully integrate the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism with the DPOP algorithm, such that each agent is only asked to perform computation, report information, and send messages that is in its own best interest. Determining agent i's payment requires solving the social choice problem without agent i. Here, we present a method to reuse computation performed in solving the main problem in a way that is robust against manipulation by the excluded agent. Experimental results on structured problems show that as much as 87% of the computation required for solving the marginal problems can be avoided by re-use, providing very good scalability in the number of agents. On unstructured problems, we observe a sensitivity of M-DPOP to the density of the problem, and we show that reusability decreases from almost 100% for very sparse problems to around 20% for highly connected problems. We close with a discussion of the features of DCOP that enable faithful implementations in this problem, the challenge of reusing computation from the main problem to marginal problems in other algorithms such as ADOPT and OptAPO, and the prospect of methods to avoid the welfare loss that can occur because of the transfer of payments to the bank.

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BAR fault tolerance for cooperative services

Cited by 124 publications

References 54 publications

Distributed Protocols for Leader Election: A Game-Theoretic Perspective

Distributed Protocols for Leader Election: A Game-Theoretic Perspective

Practical Byzantine Group Communication

M-DPOP: Faithful Distributed Implementation of Efficient Social Choice Problems

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