Behavior Choice of Game Parties under the Interference of Cognition in the Game between Coal Miners and Supervisors

Li, Jun; Wang, Chen; Wang, Xinhua; Li, Qingli

doi:10.1155/2021/5592025

Cited by 3 publications

(1 citation statement)

References 46 publications

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“…Therefore, it is necessary to study the behavior of the players under the condition of incomplete rationality. Since the evolutionary game theory deems that game players will learn in the game and seek a relatively good strategy using trial and error instead of modelling people into super rational game players [19], it has been widely used in coal mine safety research [19][20][21], food safety research [22][23][24], and other fields.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Behavior Choice Mechanisms and Tax Incentive Mechanisms in the Game of Construction Safety

2022

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The violation behavior of construction workers is an important cause of construction accidents. To reduce the violations of construction workers and to stimulate the supervision behavior of local governments and construction enterprises, an evolutionary game model is constructed in this paper. Then, the behavior choice mechanism of each player is analyzed. Finally, an incentive effect analysis method is put forward, and the incentive effects of different tax incentive mechanisms are analyzed. This research finds that only when the safety punishment imposed on construction workers is large enough does the supervision behavior of local governments and construction enterprises encourage construction workers to choose not to violate the regulation. Increasing the tax rate of a construction enterprise in the case of accidents can encourage the construction enterprise to supervise, but it inhibits the supervision behavior of the local government. A numerical simulation verifies the effectiveness of the incentive effect analysis method, which provides a new method for the incentive effect analysis of incentive mechanisms.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Behavior Choice Mechanisms and Tax Incentive Mechanisms in the Game of Construction Safety

2022

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Tripartite Evolutionary Game and Simulation Analysis of Coal Mining Safe Production Supervision under the Chinese Central Government’s Reward and Punishment Mechanism

Zhou

Tang

2021

Mathematical Problems in Engineering

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In recent years, although coal mine accidents in China have decreased, they still occur frequently. Most previous studies on the evolutionary game of safety mining are limited to a focus on system dynamics and two-party game problems and lack a spatial graphic analysis of strategy evolution. The parameters adopted are too few, and the influencing factors considered are too simple. The purpose of the paper is to introduce more parameters to study which will have an important impact on the strategy choices of participants and the evolution path of the strategy over time. We construct a tripartite evolutionary game model of coal mining enterprises, local governments, and central governments. As our method, a payment matrix of participants and replicated dynamic equations is established, and we also implement parameter simulation in MATLAB. In summary, we found that the reward and punishment mechanism plays an important role in safe coal mining. Specifically, (1) intensifying rewards and penalties for coal mining enterprises and local governments will help encourage coal mining enterprises to implement safe production measures and local governments to implement central government safety supervision policies. However, increased rewards will reduce central government’s willingness to adopt incentive strategies. (2) The central government’s reward for coal mining enterprises’ safe production must be greater than the increased cost of safe production to encourage enterprises to implement such production. Economic incentives for local governments must be greater than the benefits of rent-seeking; only then will local governments choose to strictly implement supervision policies. (3) Increasing sales revenue and rent-seeking costs of coal mining enterprises can also encourage them to implement safe production. Therefore, a well-designed reward and punishment mechanism will change the behaviour of coal enterprises and improve the probability of safe production. The research presented in this paper further works on improving safe coal mining production and designing reasonable reward and punishment mechanisms.

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Incentive Mechanism of Construction Safety from the Perspective of Mutual Benefit

et al. 2022

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Improving the level of construction safety is an important task for stakeholders. How to balance the interests and reduce the conflicts between stakeholders has become the key factor in reducing accidents. To design incentive mechanisms that can not only improve the level of construction safety but also make the construction enterprise and construction workers mutually beneficial, differential game models under different incentive mechanisms are constructed. The study found that the greater the impact of construction workers’ safety efforts on the safety reward and punishment, the higher the level of construction safety. However, when construction workers’ efforts have too much impact on the reward and punishment, it is not conducive to the improvement of the income of the construction enterprise. The smaller the proportion of income allocated to the construction enterprise, the higher the level of construction safety. However, when the proportion of income obtained by the construction enterprise is too low, it is not conducive to the improvement of the income of the construction enterprise. The safety reward and punishment mechanism and the income sharing mechanism that meet specific conditions can make the construction enterprise and construction workers mutually beneficial. In addition, the level of construction safety and the income of the construction enterprise and construction workers under the combination mechanism composed of the reward and punishment mechanism and the income sharing mechanism is higher than that under a single mechanism.

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Behavior Choice of Game Parties under the Interference of Cognition in the Game between Coal Miners and Supervisors

Cited by 3 publications

References 46 publications

Behavior Choice Mechanisms and Tax Incentive Mechanisms in the Game of Construction Safety

Behavior Choice Mechanisms and Tax Incentive Mechanisms in the Game of Construction Safety

Tripartite Evolutionary Game and Simulation Analysis of Coal Mining Safe Production Supervision under the Chinese Central Government’s Reward and Punishment Mechanism

Incentive Mechanism of Construction Safety from the Perspective of Mutual Benefit

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