Belief, Credence, and Pragmatic Encroachment¹

Abstract

This paper compares two alternative explanations of pragmatic encroachment on knowledge (i.e., the claim that whether an agent knows that p can depend on pragmatic factors). After reviewing the evidence for such pragmatic encroachment, we ask how it is best explained, assuming it obtains. Several authors have recently argued that the best explanation is provided by a particular account of belief, which we call pragmatic credal reductivism. On this view, what it is for an agent to believe a proposition is for her credence in this proposition to be above a certain threshold, a threshold that varies depending on pragmatic factors. We show that while this account of belief can provide an elegant explanation of pragmatic encroachment on knowledge, it is not alone in doing so, for an alternative account of belief, which we call the reasoning disposition account, can do so as well. And the latter account, we argue, is far more plausible than pragmatic credal reductivism, since it accords far better with a number of claims about belief that are very hard to deny.

This paper surely contains some errors

“…However, it is unclear what the relationship is between rational belief and rational betting behavior. For example, on the view of belief found in (Ross and Schroeder 2012), one may rationally believe that p even though one is not willing to bet at any odds on p. On such a view, it is not clear that any paradox arises. Thanks to a reviewer for raising this type of case.…”

Faith and steadfastness in the face of counter-evidence

“…Other versions of this view are articulated by Fantl andMcGrath (2002), Weatherson (2005), Pace (2011), and Ross and Schroeder (2014). Two important dimensions that these views differ on are whether the individual who believes must explicitly adopt X in decision-making or simply act as if X holds, and whether pragmatic factors affect whether a credence suffices to give rise to a belief or whether a credence suffices to justify a belief.…”

Belief, credence, and norms

“…8 That justified belief requires credence over a threshold, which is relative to the stakes involved, is motivated in Fantl and McGrath (2002) by consideration of the phenomenon of "pragmatic encroachment." One kind of Modified Threshold View is what Schroeder and Ross (2012) call Pragmatic Credal Reductivism, spelled out in Weatherson (2005), and (under one interpretation) Fantl and McGrath (2010). (See also Harsanyi (1985) for a view of this type.)…”

“…The latter argues that the notion of binary belief is useful, though "may not in the end capture any important aspect of rationality"(ix). Theories in which belief and credence play different roles in the same domain include the "reasoning disposition account" of Ross and Schroeder (2012). Theories in which credence and belief play the same role but occupy a different discourse include that of Frankish (2009).…”

“…32 Though Ross and Schroeder (2012) argue that its application rests on belief: belief plays a role in setting up decision problems, about which we can then reason using credences. 33 This isn't to say we can't explain actions in lottery cases using beliefs: they can perfectly well be explained using beliefs about objective chances.…”