This paper surely contains some errors

Abstract

The preface paradox can be motivated by appealing to a plausible inference from an author's reasonable assertion that her book is bound to contain errors to the author's rational belief that her book contains errors. By evaluating and undermining the validity of this inference, I offer a resolution of the paradox. Discussions of the preface paradox have surprisingly failed to note that expressions of fallibility made in prefaces typically employ terms such as surely, undoubtedly, and bound to be. After considering what these terms mean, I show that the motivating inference is invalid. Moreover, I argue that a closer consideration of our expressions of fallibility suggest that epistemically responsible authors would not be rational to believe that their books contains errors. I conclude by considering alternative expressions of fallibility that employ terms such as possible and probable, and discuss the role that expressions of fallibility play in conversation.

Sceptical Theism and the Paradox of Evil

“…10 Makinson [1965], Klein [1985], Foley [1993], and Christensen [2004] all reject a version of PP1. Pollock [1990], Ryan [1991], Kaplan [1996], Adler [2002], and Kim [2015] all reject versions of PP2, PP3, or their conjunction. Finally, Schechter [2013] argues that the real problem behind the preface paradox, a problem with the deductive closure of justification, re-appears even after the probabilistic resolution discussed above.…”

A bitter pill for closure

“…Alternatively, those sympathetic to closure have the option of rejecting (P3) instead. Advocates of this latter strategy include Pollock (1986), Ryan (1991), Leplin (2009), Kaplan (2013), Kim (2015), and Smith (2016). Arguments for rejecting (P3) typically pivot on the idea that the author's mere recognition of her own fallibility is not sufficient to justify the belief that her book will contain any errors.…”

The Hardest Paradox for Closure

“…In the preface paradox, it is effectively left open what kind of evidence I have for believing each of P 1 , P 2 , … , P 100 , allowing us to fill in the details as we see fit, but the evidence I have for believing ̃P 1 ∨̃P 2 ∨ … ∨̃P 100 is fixed-it consists in the fact that I am fallible and that comparably ambitious books have always turned out to contain falsehoods. By denying that belief can be justified on the basis of this 'pessimistic inductive' evidence, one can avoid the paradox and preserve Closure (see, for instance, Ryan 1991;Kaplan 2013;Kim 2015;Smith 2016, section 4.1).…”