Beware of the gorilla: Effect of goal priming on inattentional blindness

Abstract

When people's attention is engaged in a visual task, they often are blind to unexpected events occurring in their environment. This phenomenon is known as inattentional blindness. In this study, we examine inattentional blindness with regard to goal priming, a technique allowing to unconsciously influence goal pursuit. After being primed with a detection goal, the name of the target to detect, or no prime, participants watched a short sequence in which they had to count passes made by basketball players. An unexpected event occurred during the video. Results indicated that when attentional demands of the monitoring task were moderate, goal priming improved the detection of the unexpected event. Implications for the understanding of nonconscious management of attention will be discussed.

The role of perceptual and cognitive load on inattentional blindness: A systematic review and three meta-analyses

“…Sixteen studies (Table 2) were considered as investigating cognitive load (Beanland & Chan, 2016; Bredemeier & Simons, 2012; de Fockert & Bremner, 2011; Fougnie & Marois, 2007; Hannon & Richards, 2010; Harvey et al, 2018; Kreitz et al, 2015; Kreitz, Furley, Memmert, et al, 2016; Kreitz, Furley, Simons, et al, 2016; Légal et al, 2017; Matsuyoshi et al, 2010; Pizzighello & Bressan, 2008; Richards et al, 2010, 2014; Seegmiller et al, 2011; Todd et al, 2005). It should be noted that those studies were all computer-based experiments, none of them being conducted into a more ecological context (e.g., driving simulator).…”

“…The rationale is that the more items are stored in WM, the higher the cognitive load. It is worth noting that the WM task either took place along with an additional attentional task (i.e., dual-task paradigms: de Fockert & Bremner, 2011; Harvey et al, 2018; Légal et al, 2017; Pizzighello & Bressan, 2008) or stood on its own (i.e., single-task paradigms: Fougnie & Marois, 2007; Matsuyoshi et al, 2010; Todd et al, 2005). In the former case, observers performed both the WM task and an attentional task; the unexpected stimulus appeared along with other stimuli that were part of the attentional task (e.g., target and non-target letters in the objet-tracking task).…”

“…Indeed, seven (out of 16) studies reported significant results in opposition (or partially in opposition) with those predictions (Table 2). More precisely, two studies showed greater IB rates in high rather than in low cognitive load (dual-task paradigms) when the unexpected stimulus competed with other stimuli (Légal et al, 2017;Pizzighello & Bressan, 2008).…”

“…Sixteen studies (Table 2) were considered as investigating cognitive load (Beanland & Chan, 2016;Bredemeier & Simons, 2012;de Fockert & Bremner, 2011;Fougnie & Marois, 2007;Harvey et al, 2018;Kreitz et al, 2015;Légal et al, 2017;Matsuyoshi et al, 2010;Pizzighello & Bressan, 2008;Richards et al, 2010Richards et al, , 2014Seegmiller et al, 2011;Todd et al, 2005). It should be noted that those studies were all computer-based experiments, ---Insert Table 2 about here ---In the first type of paradigms, cognitive resources were manipulated directly through a WM task that engaged more or less WM resources depending on the cognitive load condition.…”

“…However, “attentional resources” is a broad and imprecise umbrella term in the face of the diversity of resources-based models of attention (e.g., Kahneman, 1973; Lavie, 2010; Norman & Bobrow, 1975; Pashler, 1998; Wickens, 2008; see also Desimone & Duncan, 1995). Moreover, attentional resources manipulations have been achieved through so many different paradigms in IB studies (e.g., Beanland & Pammer, 2010; Horwood & Beanland, 2016; Légal et al, 2017; Richards et al, 2014; Todd et al, 2005) that one could wonder whether those studies actually manipulated similar or different kinds (or pools) of resources (e.g., Lavie, 2010; Wickens, 2008) and whether their results could be understood within a common theoretical framework.…”