Bicameral Conflict Resolution in the European Union: An Empirical Analysis of Conciliation Committee Bargains

Abstract

This article is a study of bicameral conflict resolution between the Council and the European Parliament in the European Union, which has established a bicameral conciliation process under the co-decision procedure. Scholars commonly agree that the European Parliament has gained power under the co-decision procedure, but the impact of the conciliation process on the power distribution between the Council and the European Parliament remains unclear. The scholarly debate suggests that the power of the institutional actors depends on their proximity to the status quo, the (im-)patience and the specific preference distribution of the institutional actors, although most analyses assume that the Commission plays an insignificant role. Using an ordered probit model, this study examines the power distribution between the two institutional actors, the factors for their bargaining success and the role of the Commission in the period between 1999 and 2002. The findings show that the European Parliament wins most conflicts, but that the Council is more successful in multi-dimensional disputes. The results confirm some theoretical claims made in the literature, such as the importance of the status quo location and of preference cohesiveness. However, they also reject a major assumption in the literature on the irrelevance of the Commission in the conciliation process, which we show to have an influential informational position for parliamentary success. T H E C O N C I L I A T I O N C O M M I T T E E : I N S T I T U T I O N O F B I C A M E R A L C O N F L I C T R E S O L U T I O NThis study examines bicameral conflict resolution in the conciliation process of the European Union (EU). Compared to the insightful scholarly discussion on the merits of bicameralism in general, and the increasing role of the European Parliament (EP) in EU legislation in particular, we have little evidence on the mechanism of the conciliation process and the distribution of power between the European Parliament and the Council in the conciliation committee. The predominant view is that conciliation committees are smaller, and therefore it is easier to bargain and trade votes in a co-operative manner.1 This co-operative perspective has drawn attention to the question of bicameral representation in conciliation committees and shifted the focus away from institutional characteristics of decision making and the analysis of conciliation outcomes. In their seminal study on bicameralism, Tsebelis and Money remind us of the mixed nature of conciliation committees: 'decision making in these committees is cooperative', but 'the composition of the committee, its decision-making rule, and the set of bicameral restrictions are critically important to the results of bicameral bargaining'.

The distribution of power among EU institutions: who wins under codecision and why?

“…Although our evidence refers to proposals adopted at all stages of the codecision procedure, our findings are broadly in line with previous research that focused specifically on conciliation committee negotiations (König et al 2007). The results show that the relative bargaining success of the two institutions is influenced by relative proximity to the status quo and by internal division in EP.…”

The European Commission–Appointment, preferences, and institutional relations

“…This leads to a second puzzle: Anecdotal evidence as well as the few related empirical studies (see König et al 2007 andRasmusen 2003) suggest that Commission and Parliament get along very well -and, in fact, seemingly better than Commission and Council. This was a common impression even before the mentioned legal changes, particularly regarding the issue of integration and pursuit of "an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe" as set out in the preamble of the founding Treaty of Rome.…”

Codecision in context: implications for the balance of power in the EU

“…The procedural rules in place today are essentially those laid down in the Treaty of Amsterdam, the only difference being that the Council now decides by qualified majority in all policy domains, including those which before required unanimity. 2 Empirical studies, e.g.,König et al (2007), generally confirm these theoretical claims.3 SeeCrombez and Vangerven (2014) for an extensive survey.…”