Biology and Evolutionary Games

Broom, Mark; Křivan, Vlastimil

doi:10.1007/978-3-319-44374-4_31

Cited by 4 publications

(1 citation statement)

References 91 publications

(84 reference statements)

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“…Our method can be used to design experimental evolution experiments mimicking "evolutionary games" observed in cases when encounters of animals with antagonistic features within a population do not always escalate to fights (Smith 1982). e cooperative behavior suggests that selection acts on the population level, and is good for a species; this seems to contradict the Darwinian viewpoint that selection acts on the individual level, where individuals with di ferential fitness are always fighting (Broom and Krivan 2018). We are planning to apply siBar to compare the e fects of taking these two selection strategies.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Lineage tracing via associative chromosome/plasmid barcoding with siBar

Han

Nekrutenko

2022

Preprint

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We describe a new method, siBar, which enables simultaneous tracking of plasmids and chromosomal lineages within a bacterial host. siBar involves integration of a linearized plasmid construct carrying a unique combination of two molecular barcodes. Upon recircularization one barcode remains integrated into the host chromosome, while the other remains on the plasmid allowing direct observation of expansion and contraction of adaptive lineages. We also performed a pilot evolution experiment that allowed us to assess the barcode complexity and establish an analytical framework for the analysis of siBar data.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Lineage tracing via associative chromosome/plasmid barcoding with siBar

Han

Nekrutenko

2022

Preprint

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Modelling Evolution in Structured Populations Involving Multiplayer Interactions

2020

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We consider models of evolution in structured populations involving multiplayer games. Whilst also discussing other models, we focus on the modelling framework developed by Broom and Rychtář (J Theor Biol 302:70-80, 2012) onwards. This includes key progress so far, the main gaps and limitations, the relationship and synergies with other models and a discussion of the direction of future work. In this regard as well as discussing existing work, there is some new research on the applicability and robustness of current models with respect to using them to model real populations. This is an important potential advance, as previously all of the work has been entirely theoretical. In particular, the most complex models will have many parameters, and we concentrate on considering simpler versions with a small number of parameters which still possess the key features which would make them applicable. We find that these models are generally robust, in particular issues that can arise related to small payoff changes at critical values and removal of pivotal vertices would have similar effects on other modelling system including evolutionary graph theory. These often occur where it can be argued that there is a lack of robustness in the real system that the model faithfully picks up, and so is not a problematic feature.

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Reducing courtship time promotes marital bliss: The Battle of the Sexes game revisited with costs measured as time lost

Cressman

Křivan

2020

Journal of Theoretical Biology

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Classic bimatrix games, that are based on pair-wise interactions between two opponents belonging to different populations, do not consider the cost of time. In this article, we build on an old idea that lost opportunity costs affect individual fitness. We calculate fitnesses of each strategy for a two-strategy bimatrix game at the equilibrium distribution of the pair formation process that includes activity times. This general approach is then applied to the Battle of the Sexes game where we analyze the evolutionary outcome by finding the Nash equilibria (NE) of this time-constrained game when courtship and child rearing costs are measured by time lost. While the classic Battle of the Sexes game has either a unique strict NE (specifically, all males exhibit Philanderer behavior and either all females are Coy or all are Fast depending on model parameters), or a unique interior NE where both sexes exhibit mixed behavior, including time costs for courtship and child rearing changes this prediction. First, (Philanderer, Coy) is never a NE. Second, if the benefit of having offspring is independent of parental strategies, (Philanderer, Fast) is the unique strict NE but a second stable interior NE emerges when courtship time is sufficiently short. In fact, as courtship time becomes shorter, this mixed NE (where most males are Faithful and the Coy female population is increasing) attracts almost all initial population configurations. Third, this latter promotion of marital bliss also occurs when parents who share in child rearing receive a higher benefit from their offspring than those that don't. Finally, for courtship time of moderate duration, the same phenomenon occurs when the population size increases.

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Biology and Evolutionary Games

Abstract: This chapter surveys some evolutionary games used in biological sciences. These include the Hawk-Dove game, the Prisoner's Dilemma, Rock-Paper-Scissors, the war of attrition, the Habitat Selection game, predatorprey games, and signalling games.

Cited by 4 publications

References 91 publications

Lineage tracing via associative chromosome/plasmid barcoding with siBar

Lineage tracing via associative chromosome/plasmid barcoding with siBar

Modelling Evolution in Structured Populations Involving Multiplayer Interactions

Reducing courtship time promotes marital bliss: The Battle of the Sexes game revisited with costs measured as time lost

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