Blame and Wrongdoing

Brown, Jessica

doi:10.1017/epi.2017.23

Cited by 7 publications

(5 citation statements)

References 36 publications

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“…Because it is so central, a great deal of philosophical work has been done on the nature and norms of moral blame. Relatively recently, epistemologists have begun focusing more attention on something they call 'epistemic blame' (Brown 2020(Brown , 2017Rettler 2018;Nottelmann 2007; Peels 2016; Williamson forthcoming; Littlejohn forthcoming). 1 Epistemic blame is supposedly distinct from moral blame, while nevertheless sharing some of moral blame's characteristic features.…”

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confidence: 99%

There is a distinctively epistemic kind of blame

Boult

2020

Philos Phenomenol Research

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Is there a distinctively epistemic kind of blame? It has become commonplace for epistemologists to talk about epistemic blame, and to rely on this notion for theoretical purposes. But not everyone is convinced. Some of the most compelling reasons for skepticism about epistemic blame focus on disanologies, or asymmetries, between the moral and epistemic domains. In this paper, I defend the idea that there is a distinctively epistemic kind of blame. I do so primarily by developing an account of the nature of epistemic blame. My account draws on a prominent line of theorizing in moral philosophy that ties blame to our relationships with one another. I argue that with my account of epistemic blame on hand, the most compelling worries about epistemic blame can be deflated. There is a distinctively epistemic kind of blame. the relationship-based account of epistemic blame on hand, none of them has much force. There is a distinctively epistemic kind of blame. 2 2. The Problem of Cool Judgment Recently, R.J. Wallace (2013) has argued that the sting, force, and depth of blame are to be explained in terms of the idea that blame is essentially a kind of negative emotional response. Blame essentially involves negative reactive attitudes such as indignation, resentment, and guilt (in the case of self-blame). Wallace is not alone in this view. Indeed, he is a prominent voice among a large number of moral philosophers who take a broadly 'Strawsonian' approach to blame (Strawson 1962; Wolf 2013; Menges 2017). Why take such an approach? Consider the familiar distinction between judging that something is valuable, and actually valuing it. Wallace proposes we model the distinction between judging blameworthy and blaming on this distinction. The difference between judging X valuable and actually valuing X comes down to a difference in one's engagement with X. When one values X, one is engaged and exercised by X. One gets excited by opportunities to X, disappointed by missing opportunities to X. Meanwhile, in judging X valuable, one merely recognizes that there are reasons for someone to be so exercised, without yet necessarily being that way oneself. According to Wallace, something similar is true of blame. When one blames someone for doing something, one is engaged and exercised by what they have done. It matters to one that this person has done something bad, or flouted some norm, and by blaming them for it one manifests this concern in an engaged way. Meanwhile, in judging someone blameworthy, one merely judges that there are reasons for one (or someone else) to be so engaged, without yet necessarily being that way oneself. The key point, according to Wallace, is that the emotions are an integral part of what it is for human beings to be 'engaged' and 'exercised' in this way. Imagine someone claiming to value opera without feeling any emotion whatsoever about the prospect of going to the Met. Other things being equal, it would be natural to conclude that they do not actually value opera (even though they might judge it valuable)....

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confidence: 99%

There is a distinctively epistemic kind of blame

Boult

2020

Philos Phenomenol Research

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“…6 According to belief-desire accounts, epistemic blame consists in a characteristic set of dispositions that are connected to a belief-desire pair. This view is due to Brown (2017Brown ( , 2020aBrown ( , 2020b, and is based on Sher's (2006) account of moral blame. Sher takes it that moral blame consists in a characteristic set of dispositions-for instance, dispositions to remonstrate, feel upset, request justifications or apologiesthat are causally connected to a belief-desire pair; namely, the belief that the targeted agent violated a moral norm and the desire that they hadn't.…”

Section: Three Accounts Of Epistemic Blamementioning

confidence: 99%

“…Typically, our reactions to purely epistemic failings are not strong enough that the emotion itself carries a depth, force or sting. Brown (2017Brown ( , 2020b offers a diagnosis of why strong negative emotions (and associated dispositions to punish, rebuke, etc) are commonplace in the moral case, but seem out of place in response to epistemological failings. Moral norm violation constitutes a wrongdoing, which usually involves harming a victim.…”

Section: The Force Of Epistemic Blamementioning

confidence: 99%

Scepticism about epistemic blame

Smartt

2023

Philos Stud

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I advocate scepticism about epistemic blame; the view that we have good reason to think there is no distinctively epistemic form of blame. Epistemologists often find it useful to draw a distinction between blameless and blameworthy norm violation. In recent years, this has led several writers to develop theories of ‘epistemic blame.’ I present two challenges against the very idea of epistemic blame. First, everything that is supposedly done by epistemic blame is done by epistemic evaluation, at least according to a prominent view about the social role of epistemic evaluation. Parsimony considerations count against introducing an idle mechanism that does the same work as an existing one. Second, no current theory of epistemic blame includes a plausible account of the force of epistemic blame or the practices that could express it. I conclude that we should give up the notion of epistemic blame.

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“…Jessica Brown is one of the leading theorists to point out the fundamental role that appeals to epistemic blame, blameworthiness, and blamelessness play in epistemological theorizing. She highlights the importance of blame‐talk for the epistemic norms debates (Brown, 2017, p. 1). She also argues that blame‐talk is important in debates about epistemic justification.…”

Section: Motivating Epistemic Blamementioning

confidence: 99%

Epistemic blame

Boult

2021

Philosophy Compass

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This paper provides a critical overview of recent work on epistemic blame. The paper identifies key features of the concept of epistemic blame and discusses two ways of motivating the importance of this concept. Four different approaches to the nature of epistemic blame are examined. Central issues surrounding the ethics and value of epistemic blame are identified and briefly explored. In addition to providing an overview of the state of the art of this growing but controversial field, the paper highlights areas where future work is needed.

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Blame and Wrongdoing

Cited by 7 publications

References 36 publications

There is a distinctively epistemic kind of blame

There is a distinctively epistemic kind of blame

Scepticism about epistemic blame

Epistemic blame

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