Bradley’s Regress

Abstract

Ever since F. H. Bradley first formulated his (in)famous regress argument philosophers have been hard at work trying to refute it. The argument fails, it has been suggested, either because its conclusion just does not follow from its premises, or it fails because one or more of its premises should be given up. In this paper, the Bradleyan argument, as well as some of the many and varied reactions it has received, is scrutinized.

Regress, unity, facts, and propositions

“…But he also states that the problem has to do with the fact that "in general…the fact that an object instantiates a certain property does not flow from the nature of the object and the nature of the universal that are involved", and that relates more directly to the constitution regress. Maurin (2012), p. 800, makes a point similar to that I am making in the main text. 7 Candlish (2007, p. 167f).…”

“…One way of dealing with Bradley's regress that I have not dealt with in the main text is the 14 See e.g. Maurin (2012). say about the regress that Lewis states-a regress which, in Lewis' words, rules out that having is a relation?…”

El regreso de Bradley y el problema de la unidad-compleja: ¿Tropos al rescate?

“…1 Todo indica que Bradley está pensando en el es de identidad o, como diría un escolástico, en el es que figura en la definición real de un objeto, i.e., el enunciado de identidad que define la cosa (no su nombre ni su concepto) en términos informativos, consistentes y verdaderos. Bonino (2013) y Maurin (2010Maurin ( , 2012, correctamente, aprueban esta interpretación de Baxter (1996). Lo que hace que el significado de es le parezca dudoso a Bradley no es que él dude de que ese es esté por el es de identidad, sino que parece no haber forma alguna en que la aserción de identidad en cuestión pueda de hecho expresar algo que sea informativo, consistente y verdadero.…”

“…3 Parto comprendiendo el terrón de azúcar como un cúmulo de tropos simplemente para efectos argumentales, pues ésta es la forma en que los teóricos de tropos suelen comprender la estructura de un particular concreto (cfr. Campbell 1990;Maurin 2010Maurin , 2012Molnar 2003;Simons 1994;Williams 1953) y son las propuestas de solución que se han ofrecido desde esta ontología las que son objeto de mi crítica. Pero nada realmente serio depende de asumir esto.…”

Super-relationism: combining eliminativism about objects and relationism about spacetime

“…Besides, there is no reason why connecting a property to a relation (another way to describe a property acting as the relata of a relation) should be more difficult than connecting it to a substrate. The problem of connection is a more general problem and is known as Bradley's regress (Bradley 1893; for discussion, see Maurin 2012). If the connection between a property and a substrate is described as a brute fact, then I fail to see why the connection between a property and a relation could not also be construed as a brute fact.…”