2018
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-76953-0_1
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Breaking Ed25519 in WolfSSL

Abstract: This publication is distributed under the terms of Article 25fa of the Dutch Copyright Act (Auteurswet) with explicit consent by the author. Dutch law entitles the maker of a short scientific work funded either wholly or partially by Dutch public funds to make that work publicly available for no consideration following a reasonable period of time after the work was first published, provided that clear reference is made to the source of the first publication of the work. This publication is distributed under Th… Show more

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Cited by 16 publications
(10 citation statements)
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“…We now exercise our fault-resilient unforgeability notion to establish that derandomized schemes are vulnerable to the weakest fault injection attack of random one-bit flips. This in particular confirms the corresponding observations by Poddebniak et al and others [48,54,1,56] in our formalism. To recap, derandomization here refers to the approach to deterministically extract a permessage random value from the secret signing key and message input, replacing an otherwise needed true random sampling of a per-message nonce.…”
Section: De-randomized Signatures Are Not Fault-resilientsupporting
confidence: 94%
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“…We now exercise our fault-resilient unforgeability notion to establish that derandomized schemes are vulnerable to the weakest fault injection attack of random one-bit flips. This in particular confirms the corresponding observations by Poddebniak et al and others [48,54,1,56] in our formalism. To recap, derandomization here refers to the approach to deterministically extract a permessage random value from the secret signing key and message input, replacing an otherwise needed true random sampling of a per-message nonce.…”
Section: De-randomized Signatures Are Not Fault-resilientsupporting
confidence: 94%
“…In several works concurrent and closely related to that by Poddebniak et al [48], Romailler and Pelissier [54], Ambrose et al [1], as well as Samwel et al [56,55] studied differential fault and side-channel attacks on deterministic signatures in general and the ECDSA and EdDSA schemes specifically, also revisiting a previous result by Barenghi and Pelosi [5]. Notably, all works agree that adding randomness back into the signing process is necessary in order to prevent the described fault attacks.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 70%
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