Building a Competitive Authoritarian Regime: State–Business Relations in the AKP’s Turkey

Abstract

The most recent global wave of democratic reversal is marked by executive takeovers. Politically motivated interventions in domestic markets aimed at restructuring the underlying power dynamics in society have been part and parcel of these takeovers. This article investigates the new political economy behind the AKP's competitive authoritarian rule in Turkey as an example of this larger trend. The article argues that the AKP government has built a loyal business class through an elaborate system of rewards and punishment since 2002. With the aim of consolidating its business constituency, the AKP politicized state institutions (debt collection, tax authorities, privatization, public procurement) and eroded the rule of law to distribute rents and resources to its supporters, transfer capital from its opponents to its supporters, and to discipline dissidents in business circles. These mechanisms allowed the party to skew the political playing field in its favour through its access to private resources as well as its disproportionate access to the media-built by pro-AKP businessmen-and thus underpinned the AKP's competitive authoritarian regime.

The Turkish presidential elections of 24 June 2018

“…These municipality governments, with their sizable budgets, constituted the main financial resource for Erdogan and his party that distributed local funds in a partisan way. Their loss would not only allow the CHP to appeal directly to voters in these provinces but also diminish Erdoğan's ability to award his cronies (Esen & Gumuscu, 2018). While the new system ran the risk of accelerating Turkey's slide to hegemonic authoritarianism, the strength of the opposition as reflected in the local elections has retained the competitiveness of the regime for now.…”

Policy Styles and Policy-Making

“…In the post-2000 period, co-optation by the government has been most prevalent with respect to business interests, who are dealt with or addressed at the firm level. Big and small firms that were established by officials of the government or their immediate family, and firms that are affiliated with progovernment associations (such as MÜSİAD), as well as local firms informally connected to the local branches of the ruling party, have time and again been awarded the lion's share in public procurement and lucrative privatization contracts throughout the 2000s ( Esen and Gumuscu, 2017 ). A similar picture emerges in the historically neglected policy areas of housing and urban regeneration, where the government implements policy through the Housing Development Administration of Turkey (TOKİ), which acts directly under the authority of the Prime Minister's Office ( Massicard, 2014 ).…”

“…A similar picture emerges in the historically neglected policy areas of housing and urban regeneration, where the government implements policy through the Housing Development Administration of Turkey (TOKİ), which acts directly under the authority of the Prime Minister's Office ( Massicard, 2014 ). TOKİ as controlling considerable public land engages in private partnerships with construction companies enabling them to capture significant rent on urban land especially through "income-sharing" schemes well below the market price ( Massicard, 2014 ;Esen and Gumuscu, 2017 ). Here again, most of the construction firms who have been contracted out are affiliated with pro-government business associations ( Marschall et al, 2016 ;Esen and Gumuscu, 2017 ).…”

“…TOKİ as controlling considerable public land engages in private partnerships with construction companies enabling them to capture significant rent on urban land especially through "income-sharing" schemes well below the market price ( Massicard, 2014 ;Esen and Gumuscu, 2017 ). Here again, most of the construction firms who have been contracted out are affiliated with pro-government business associations ( Marschall et al, 2016 ;Esen and Gumuscu, 2017 ). Co-optation by the government with respect to labor unions have also been prominent, such as in the case of HAK-IS, though more at the policymaking stage, as labor unions do not have a significant role in policy implementation.…”

The rural roots of the rise of the Justice and Development Party in Turkey

“…In the economic realm, the AKP privatized the great majority of the state-owned enterprises, completing the job that the (relatively) secular mainstream parties undertook since the 1980s. 1 On the other hand, by supporting the Islamist bourgeoisie much more so than the secular bourgeoisie through various favoritisms, the AKP has made significant progress (although not yet completed) in altering the balance of power in favor of the Turkish bourgeoisie's Islamist wing (Balkan, Balkan, and Öncü 2015;Esen and Gümüşçü 2018). The AKP's transformation of Turkish society and politics runs much deeper than its economic performance.…”