Bureaucratic façade and political realities of disarmament and demobilisation in Afghanistan

Giustozzi, Antonio

doi:10.1080/14678800802095369

Cited by 16 publications

(13 citation statements)

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“…This 'peace without politics' (Chandler, 2004), rather like a commercial monopoly, succeeds in reducing the opportunity for alternative or indigenous approaches to reconstruction (Mac Ginty, 2007, p. 458). As a result, donors and a narrow clique of Afghans 'own' the bureau cratic facade of reforms, while real ownership is exerted by local power holders leading to very different outcomes from those intended (Giustozzi, 2008).…”

Section: Peacebuilding Without Politics? Aid and Ownershipmentioning

confidence: 99%

Who owns the peace? Aid, reconstruction, and peacebuilding in Afghanistan

Goodhand

Sedra

2009

Disasters

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It is unclear how international donors' stated commitment to ownership and partnership 'translates' in fragile state or 'post-conflict' settings. The very notion of ownership is violently contested in Afghanistan and donors have to negotiate with, and choose between, multiple state and non-state interlocutors. The developmentalist principles outlined in the 2005 Paris Declaration may carry little meaning in such contexts and their application can have paradoxical effects that impede the emergence of broad-based ownership. The limitations of, and alternatives to, developmentalist approaches in fragile states, are explored here with reference to donor policies and practices in Afghanistan, focusing on the period following the 2001 Bonn Agreement. This paper examines how aid policies and programmes have become part of a complex bargaining game involving international actors, domestic elites, and societal groups. It argues that international donors' failure to appreciate or engage sensitively and strategically with these bargaining processes, when combined with contradictory intervention objectives, has contributed to the steady unravelling of a fragile war-to-peace transition in Afghanistan.

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Section: Peacebuilding Without Politics? Aid and Ownershipmentioning

confidence: 99%

Who owns the peace? Aid, reconstruction, and peacebuilding in Afghanistan

Goodhand

Sedra

2009

Disasters

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“…Nuanced theoreticallygrounded accounts of PGMs' influence on conflict outcomes are notable by their absence in existing literature on militia violence. To date scholars have argued that extra-dyadic armed groups surviving until the end of conflicts are likely to pose challenges for peacebuilding (Giustozzi, 2008;Marten, 2006).…”

Section: "No Peace No War" Proponentsmentioning

confidence: 99%

‘No peace, no war’ proponents? How pro-regime militias affect civil war termination and outcomes

Aliyev¹

2018

Cooperation and Conflict

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Previous research on non-state actors involved in civil wars, has tended to disregard the role of extra-dyad agents in influencing conflict outcomes. Little is known as to whether the presence of such extra-dyadic actors as pro-regime militias affects conflict termination and outcomes. This article develops and tests a number of hypotheses on the pro-government militias' effect upon civil war outcomes. It proposes that pro-regime militias involved in intrastate conflicts tend to act as proponents of "no peace, no war" favouring low activity violence and ceasefires over other conflict outcomes. These hypotheses are examined using expanded dataset on pro-government militias and armed conflict in a statistical analysis of 229 civil wars episodes from 1991 to 2015. These findings shed new light on the role of extra-state actors in civil wars.

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“…Hence the primary objective of the Afghan government was to reestablish a stateowned monopoly of violence by dismantling local militias or integrating them into formal security structures with the assistance of the international community. However, the Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration process (DDR) from 2003 to 2005, and the subsequent Disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups (DIAG) from 2005 to 2011, failed to disband the 'clientelistic' structures of commanders and their militiamen (Giustozzi 2008). In most cases, influential commanders were able to preserve their power by assuming formal positions in the government or by transforming their militias into regular army or police units.…”

Section: Role Of the Central Statementioning

confidence: 99%

“…Since 2001 the situation in Kandahar is strongly influenced by the USdriven 'War on Terror' and the counterinsurgency. While valid information about the latter is rare (Giustozzi 2007;2009b), it is interesting to note that the insurgents are deeply embedded in local communities. The rural areas, where the Taliban began their rapid military expansion in the mid1990s, have become the backbones of the movement.…”

Section: Kandahar -Feudal Warlordismmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The rural areas, where the Taliban began their rapid military expansion in the mid1990s, have become the backbones of the movement. The local population perceives the physical security provided by the Taliban to be more effective than the one offered by the government, which is seen as corrupt (Giustozzi 2007). The Taliban display ambiguity about the tribal structures: on the one hand they stick to tribal codes and values, on the other they challenge the hierarchical system of the Southern tribes by demanding social justice.…”

Section: Kandahar -Feudal Warlordismmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Local Configurations of Violence: Warlords, Tribal Leaders and Insurgents in Afghanistan

Schetter¹,

Glassner²

2011

S+F

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On the backdrop of a weak central government the article examines three types of local configurations of violence in Afghanistan. The concentration of power at the local level is so strong, that even the core institutions of the state are under control of local interests. Thus, in Kandahar province powerful tribal individuals control the means of violence. The combination of insurgency, drug networks and tribal structures has encouraged the emergence of strong warlords and the Taliban in Kandahar. In contrast to Kandahar, Kunduz province shows myriads of minifiefdoms as well as localized 'rules of law', or 'rules of the gun', which result in fragmented warlordism. Finally, in Paktia province tribal identities are the most important points of reference. The Pashtun tribal code of law and behavior is the 'rule of the game', and Paktia tribes settle their conflicts in tribal gatherings by discussion until a consensus is reached.

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Bureaucratic façade and political realities of disarmament and demobilisation in Afghanistan

Cited by 16 publications

References 1 publication

Who owns the peace? Aid, reconstruction, and peacebuilding in Afghanistan

Who owns the peace? Aid, reconstruction, and peacebuilding in Afghanistan

‘No peace, no war’ proponents? How pro-regime militias affect civil war termination and outcomes

Local Configurations of Violence: Warlords, Tribal Leaders and Insurgents in Afghanistan

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