Candidate ability and platform choice

Dix, Manfred; Santore, Rudy

doi:10.1016/s0165-1765(02)00047-2

Cited by 19 publications

(13 citation statements)

References 7 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…1 The only situations in which there are pure strategy equilibria are those in which one candidate's valence advantage is so large that this candidate wins with certainty in equilibrium. Examples of such equilibria can be found in Ansolabehere and Snyder (2000) and Dix and Santore (2002).…”

Section: The Modelmentioning

confidence: 96%

On the nature of equilibria in a Downsian model with candidate valence

Hummel

2010

Games and Economic Behavior

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Section: The Modelmentioning

confidence: 96%

On the nature of equilibria in a Downsian model with candidate valence

Hummel

2010

Games and Economic Behavior

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

“…2 That firms locate at a same spot may not be an equilibrium or may not be a unique equilibrium. For more discussions, see, e.g., Ansolabehere and Snyder [5] and Dix and Santore [6], both assuming quadratic trasportation costs. 3 Firm 1 would choose locating at the middle, S 1 = 0.5, if it were to make a choice.…”

Section: The Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

On Transportation Cost and Product Differentiation in Hotelling’s Model

Li¹

2012

TEL

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

We model transportation cost in Hotelling's model as a general exponential function and analyze firms' location choice. As a first step, we take prices as exogenous and focus on the positioning strategy of the firm whose product generates a lower net-of-price utility. We find the firm locates further away from its competitor when the transportation cost (if convex) becomes more convex and when it (if concave) becomes more concave. Minimum differentiation is obtained when the transportation cost is linear in travel distance.

show abstract

“…This is the first work to analyze spatial policy competition with endogenous second-stage valence competition between two office-motivated candidates under general assumptions about the distribution of voter policy preferences, voter disutility, and cost of valence functions. Previous work, such as Londregan and Romer (1993), Ansolabehere and Snyder (2000), Groseclose (2001), Aragones and Palfrey (2002), and Dix and Santore (2002) considered the effects of exogenous valence. If the candidates are motivated only by office, then there is no pure strategy equilibrium in which both candidates have positive payoffs (Ansolabehere and Snyder 2000).…”

Section: Related Recent Workmentioning

confidence: 99%