Causal reasoning in the attribution of rare and common events.

Abstract

Three studies investigated causal reasoning when 2 dispositions-one more common than the other-are both consistently associated with a behavior. Subjects rated the rare disposition as the more important cause when the behavior itself was rare but violated the covariation principle by rating the common disposition as more important when the behavior was relatively common. Results suggest that use of the covariation principle may be the most important heuristic for inferring causality only when the action to be explained is relatively rare. When the behavior is a common one, causal attributions may be more influenced by a principle of generative strength, with observers assigning greater causal importance to the disposition they believe to be stronger.As Kahneman and Varey (1990) have noted, the study of causality has traditionally been approached from two very different perspectives. The dominant view in both psychology and philosophy has antecedents in the writings of Hume (1739/ 1964) and Mill (1872. This perspective treats causality in terms of probability, as a contingent relation between events. For example, Mill proposed that a factor is designated a cause if it is present when the effect is present and absent when the effect is absent (i.e., the method of difference). Within psychology, Mill's proposals have a close affinity with the views of Kelley (1967), who suggested that the naive attributor tends to base causal attributions on a principle of covariation.From McArthur (1972) on, the bulk of empirical evidence in social psychology has indicated that attributions are in fact frequently covariation based. Recently, Fosterling (1989) has suggested that extensions and refinements of the Kelley model (e.g., Hewstone & Jaspars, 1987;Hilton & Slugoski, 1986;Pruitt & Insko, 1980) can be unified within an analysis of variance (ANOVA) framework, and Cheng and Novick (1990Novick ( , 1991Novick ( , 1992 have proposed a probabilistic extension of the ANOVA analogy. These investigators offered impressive evidence that, at least when people are given sufficient information, causal attributions are indeed determined by covariation.Despite the support for a covariation-based explanation of

Constraints on equifinality: Goals are good explanations only for controllable outcomes

“…These ®ndings parallel Reeder and Brewer's (1979) claim that any cause may explain a moderate or poor performance, whereas an exceptionally good (i.e. extreme) performance points to ability, which is a form of precondition (see also Johnson, Boyd, & Magnani, 1994). These ®ndings with extreme events support the claim that explanations re¯ect the clause that is most abnormal in the circumstances (e.g.…”

“…Other studies suggest that extreme events generate attributions to a single extreme cause (Fiedler, 1982 ;McClure et al, 1991 ;Johnson et al, 1994). Morris and Smith (1993) found that with extreme actions, a goal is likely to be insu¬cient and is likely to be accompanied by preconditions such as ability or luck, a ®nding supported by McClure and Hilton (1997).…”

Distinguishing the effects of beliefs and preconditions: the folk psychology of goals and actions

“…These results deal with predictions rather than explanations, but they are consistent with research showing that explanations of common actions tend to cite goals more than preconditions (e.g. Johnson et al, 1994;Malle, 1999;Malle & Knobe, 1997;Malle et al, 2000;McClure, 2002;McClure & Hilton, 1997, 1998Sutton & McClure, 2001).…”

“…Research shows that people usually prefer goals to explain a wide range of common actions, but prefer preconditions to explain actions that are extreme in the sense that they are often not attainable (e.g. Johnson et al, 1994;Lalljee & Abelson, 1983;Leddo & Abelson, 1986;Leddo et al, 1984;McClure, 1998;McClure et al, 1991;McClure & Hilton, 1997;McGill, 1990;N'gbala & Branscombe, 1995;Reeder & Brewer, 1979;Sutton & McClure, 2001). Some causal questions can also lead people to prefer preconditions over goals as explanations (Malle et al, 2000;McClure, 2002;McClure & Hilton, 1998;McClure, Hilton, Cowan, Ishida, & Wilson, 2001).…”

On Weakening the Strongest Link: Attributions and Intervention Strategies for Behavior Change

“…Participants generally were expected to view the atypical antecedent as more predictive of the behavior. Second, consistent with Johnson et al (1994), participants generally were expected to infer that the mental antecedent that was more typical of a target figure was a stronger subjective experience than was the atypical antecedent.…”