CDU Deviancy in the German Bundestag

Rueckert, George L.; Crane, Wilder

doi:10.2307/2127703

Cited by 6 publications

(3 citation statements)

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“…Contrary to theoretical expectations, a study of deviant votes in the CDU/CSU during the second Bundestag (1953 -57) found that district legislators were less likely to deviate from their party's position than party-list legislators. 11 These early findings, however, were not confirmed in later analyses that found no significant relationship between legislator type and deviating voting behaviour until the mid-1960s. 12 More generally, the traditional view in the empirical literature on the Bundestag is that district legislators do not significantly differ in their behaviour from party-list legislators.…”

Section: Explanations Of Defection and Party Unitymentioning

confidence: 90%

Discipline, Electoral Rules and Defection in the Bundestag, 1983–94

Becher¹,

Sieberer²

2008

German Politics

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This article examines how party discipline and legislators' individual policy goals induced by electoral rules influence the likelihood of defections from the party line in the Bundestag. Using a new indicator based on legislators' explanations of their voting behaviour we find strong evidence that discipline, not policy cohesiveness alone, drives party unity. In particular, the allocation of offices by the party leadership significantly affects legislators' propensity to defect from the position of their party. First, holding an executive office reduces legislators' probability to defect by approximately 19 per cent. Second, parliamentary office also reduces legislators' probability to defect, although the effect is smaller. District legislators are not generally more prone to defect, but their propensity to defect increases if electoral competition increases.

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Section: Explanations Of Defection and Party Unitymentioning

confidence: 90%

Discipline, Electoral Rules and Defection in the Bundestag, 1983–94

Becher¹,

Sieberer²

2008

German Politics

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“…While a similar difference was also observed for the period 1990−1994 (Stratmann, 2006), other studies find no systematic differences for the periods 1957−1965 (Dishaw, 1971), 2002−2013 (Ohmura, 2014a), 2009−2013 (Zittel and Nyhuis, 2019), and 2013−2017 (Bauer-Blaschkowski and Mai, 2019) and ascribe the absence of a mandate divide to contamination between the tiers. A few studies even detect a reverse effect with more defection by list MPs for the period 1953−1957 (Dishaw, 1971; Rueckert and Crane, 1962). One study covering the years 2002−2013 addresses the role of electoral safety and found—contrary to the hypothesis advanced above—that pure district MPs defect more often the better their reelection prospects are (Ohmura, 2014a).…”

Section: Case Selection Modeling Strategy and Datamentioning

confidence: 99%

Mandate type, electoral safety, and defections from the party line: The conditional mandate divide in the German Bundestag, 1949–2013

Sieberer

Ohmura

2019

Party Politics

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Research on mixed electoral systems provides inconclusive findings on the question whether members of parliament (MPs) elected in single-member districts are more likely to vote against the party line than MPs elected via closed party lists. This article rejects both the hypothesis of a general “mandate divide” and the competing claim that contamination effects completely wash out behavioral differences. Instead, we argue that electoral incentives to defect are stronger for a specific type of MP—those who run only in a district and are electorally insecure. Statistical analyses of roll call votes in the German Bundestag covering more than 60 years support this “conditional mandate divide” against alternative hypotheses. These findings suggest a more nuanced view on electoral system effects in mixed electoral systems and highlight the importance of electoral competition for incentivizing MPs to side with district demands if those conflict with the party line.

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“…Thames () found a tier difference in Russia, but not in Hungary or Ukraine, attributing this to differences in party institutionalization. A counterexample is seen in the oldest mixed system as district legislators in Germany in 1953–57 were less likely to deviate from the party vote (Rueckert and Crane ). This result could be due to the novelty of the system, with voters and legislators alike slow to adopt institutional incentives.…”

Section: Roll‐call Analysis In Contextmentioning

confidence: 99%

Party Voting Cohesion in Mixed Member Legislative Systems: Evidence from Korea and Taiwan

Rich

2014

Legislative Studies Qtrly

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How do mixed‐member legislative systems influence legislator voting? While the literature remains inconclusive, this article suggests party influence as an intervening variable. Through an analysis of roll‐call data from Taiwan and Korea, no deviation is evident between district legislators and legislators elected by proportional representation. Further disaggregation of what it means to vote against one's party again finds little evidence of a tier distinction, while party variables remain significant. The findings are suggestive of a contamination effect between tiers, consistent with the influence of parties.

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CDU Deviancy in the German Bundestag

Cited by 6 publications

References 0 publications

Discipline, Electoral Rules and Defection in the Bundestag, 1983–94

Discipline, Electoral Rules and Defection in the Bundestag, 1983–94

Mandate type, electoral safety, and defections from the party line: The conditional mandate divide in the German Bundestag, 1949–2013

Party Voting Cohesion in Mixed Member Legislative Systems: Evidence from Korea and Taiwan

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