Channel coordination between manufacturers and competing retailers with fairness concerns

Yoshihara, Rikuo; Matsubayashi, Nobuo

doi:10.1016/j.ejor.2020.08.023

Cited by 39 publications

(24 citation statements)

References 37 publications

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“…However, behavioral economics research indicates that, in practice, consumers pay attention to both their own benefits and others' benefits [4], i.e, they will compare the benefits and test whether the distribution of benefits is fair, namely "fairness concern" [3,11]. Existing researches have pointed out there is a "horizontal fairness concern" between manufacturers and retail platforms, and both parties will feel disgusted due to the profits gap between themselves and the other [18,30]. Interestingly, consumers also show fairness concerns in their interactions with retail enterprises, namely "vertical fairness concern" [29].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Research on retail channel decisions considering consumer’s fairness concern

2022

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Online retailing provides alternative shopping channels, where the retail platform can either let manufacturers directly sell to consumers or open a self-operated channel, or even both. Regardless of sales channels, consumers often pay attention to the income gap between themselves and enterprises (named consumer's fairness concern). In this work, we explore how consumers’ fairness concerns affect the optimal decisions of both manufacturer and retail platform under different retail channel modes (single-channel mode and mixed-channel mode). The results show that consumer’s fairness concern has a negative impact on the retail price under low production cost in single-channel mode, while the retail prices in mix-channel mode are jointly determined by consumer’s fairness concern and revenue sharing ratio. Besides, if the market channel mode has not yet formed, the retail platform can choose either a self-operated channel or manufacturer consignment channel, depending on the consumer’s fairness concern level and revenue sharing ratio. By contrast, if the market channel mode has already been formed, the retail platform should make effort to reduce consumer’s fairness concern if only the self-operated channel exists, while maintain consumer’s fairness concern and revenue sharing ratio at a moderate level if there exist mixed channels.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Research on retail channel decisions considering consumer’s fairness concern

2022

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“…In the third aspect, fairness concerns have recently attracted considerable attention in the supply chain management field. For example, both Zhang et al [36] and Yoshihara and Matsubayashi [37] found that supply chain efficiency can be affected by retailers' behavior regarding fairness concerns. Zhao [38] studied how retailers' fairness concerns influence corporate decisions and found that retailers' fairness concerns can lead to the differential pricing of extended warranty services.…”

Section: Decisions Considering Fairness Concernsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Advertising Decisions of Platform Supply Chains Considering Network Externalities and Fairness Concerns

et al. 2022

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With the popularization of platform economics, many manufacturers are shifting their operations from offline to online, forming platform supply chains (PSCs), which combine e-commerce with supply chain management. To study the influences of network externalities and fairness concerns on advertising strategies of the platform supply chain (PSC), we construct decentralized decision-making models, with and without fairness concerns. Then, we solve the optimal decisions regarding PSC and use numerical examples to verify the conclusions of the decision models. We further analyze the internal influences of advertising strategies on network externalities in the extended model. We find that the network externalities are beneficial to the PSC system, but the manufacturer’s fairness concerns are not beneficial to the PSC. The advertising strategies of the network platform are not affected by network externalities and fairness concerns. In the extended model, the manufacturer can obtain more profits, but the network platform yields less profit than the decentralized model without fairness concerns. Moreover, the more sensitive the network externalities are to the change in advertising strategies, the greater the profits for the PSC members.

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“…Zhao et al studied the pricing strategy of product and service supply chain based on service competition with extended service period and compared the differences in decision-making under the retailer with unfairness concern and fairness concern [16]. Yoshihara et al studied the coordination of supply chain when two retailers have fairness concerns at the same time and found that subgame perfect Nash equilibrium can coordinate supply chain [17]. e differences from the literature such as Zhao and Yoshihara are that the study develops different demand functions, analyzes the impacts of dual-fairness concern on supply chain decision-making, and draws meaningful conclusions.…”

Section: Competitive Supply Chainmentioning

confidence: 99%

Ordering Decisions of Supply Chain with Competition and Dual‐Fairness Concern

Liu

Song

Chen

et al. 2022

Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society

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This study studies a supply chain consisting of one supplier and two retailers and analyzes the optimal decisions of ordering quantity in four types of no fairness concern, horizontal fairness concern, vertical fairness concern, and dual-fairness concern and the impacts of fairness concern on supply chain. The results show that (1) vertical fairness concern can decrease the ordering quantity of the retailer with vertical fairness concern and the wholesale price and improve the ordering quantity of the retailer without fairness concern; (2) horizontal fairness concern can increase the ordering quantity of the retailer with horizontal fairness concern and improve the ordering quantity of the retailer without fairness concern, but does not influence the wholesale price; and (3) dual-fairness concern can decrease the ordering quantity of the retailer with dual-fairness concern and the wholesale price and improve the ordering quantity of the retailer without fairness concern as a whole. The numerical analysis also proves the findings.

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Channel coordination between manufacturers and competing retailers with fairness concerns

Cited by 39 publications

References 37 publications

Research on retail channel decisions considering consumer’s fairness concern

Research on retail channel decisions considering consumer’s fairness concern

Advertising Decisions of Platform Supply Chains Considering Network Externalities and Fairness Concerns

Ordering Decisions of Supply Chain with Competition and Dual‐Fairness Concern

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