Characterization of Meaconing and its Impact on GNSS Receivers

Coulon, Maxandre; Chabory, Alexandre; Garcia-Pena, Axel; Vezinet, Jérémy; Macabiau, Christophe; Estival, Philippe; Ladoux, Pierre; Roturier, Benoît

doi:10.33012/2020.17713

Cited by 13 publications

(5 citation statements)

References 3 publications

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“…Advanced forms of meaconing allow spoofing of arbitrary positions by individually delaying each signal [4]. However, a lock on all counterfeit signals is not guaranteed and depends on factors such as the target's speed [28]. As a consequence, the resulting position of the victim is not always the attacker's position and to some extent unpredictable.…”

Section: Attack Model and Scenariosmentioning

confidence: 99%

Detecting Maritime GPS Spoofing Attacks Based on NMEA Sentence Integrity Monitoring

Spravil

Hemminghaus

Rechenberg

et al. 2023

JMSE

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Today’s maritime transportation relies on global navigation satellite systems (GNSSs) for accurate navigation. The high-precision GNSS receivers on board modern vessels are often considered trustworthy. However, due to technological advances and malicious activities, this assumption is no longer always true. Numerous incidents of tampered GNSS signals have been reported. Furthermore, researchers have demonstrated that manipulations can be carried out even with inexpensive hardware and little expert knowledge, lowering the barrier for malicious attacks with far-reaching consequences. Hence, exclusive trust in GNSS is misplaced, and methods for reliable detection are urgently needed. However, many of the proposed solutions require expensive replacement of existing hardware. In this paper, therefore, we present MAritime Nmea-based Anomaly detection (MANA), a novel low-cost framework for GPS spoofing detection. MANA monitors NMEA-0183 data and advantageously combines several software-based methods. Using simulations supported by real-world experiments that generate an extensive dataset, we investigate our approach and finally evaluate its effectiveness.

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Section: Attack Model and Scenariosmentioning

confidence: 99%

Detecting Maritime GPS Spoofing Attacks Based on NMEA Sentence Integrity Monitoring

Spravil

Hemminghaus

Rechenberg

et al. 2023

JMSE

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“…However, even such legitimate use cases can turn into unintentional meaconing incidents, if, for instance, the hangar door is left open and the replayed signal provides GNSS receivers outside the hangar with conflicting location information [7,8]. real-time.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Distributed and Mobile Message Level Relaying/Replaying of GNSS Signals

Lenhart¹,

Spanghero²,

Papadimitratos³

2022

The International Technical Meeting of the the Institute of Navigation

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“…Meaconing attackers use the repeaters to receive and retransmit the whole spectrum of authentic signals (Coulon et al, 2020). Since all information in meaconing attack signals is the same as authentic signals, this type of spoofing has the potential to compromise all GNSS signals, including encrypted military signals.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Authenticating GNSS civilian signals: a survey

Yuan

Tang

2023

Satell Navig

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Civilian services of Global Navigation Satellite System are threatened by spoofing attacks since it is hard to determine the authenticity of a navigation signal with a detailed structure open to the public. Signal authentication effectively protects the security of the signal by attaching unforgeable information to one or several elements of the signal. Receivers can verify the authenticity of the signal by extracting and validating this information. Developing good signal authentication schemes requires understanding possible spoofing modes, signal element specialty, and performance evaluation methods. This paper is an overview of navigation signal authentication, where the theories and reported approaches are described in detail. A design/performance matrix that demonstrates the advantages and defects of the signal element and its authentication design is summarized. Recommendations are proposed to improve the robustness, security, efficiency, and implementation hardness for future designs of navigation signal authentication.

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Characterization of Meaconing and its Impact on GNSS Receivers

Cited by 13 publications

References 3 publications

Detecting Maritime GPS Spoofing Attacks Based on NMEA Sentence Integrity Monitoring

Detecting Maritime GPS Spoofing Attacks Based on NMEA Sentence Integrity Monitoring

Distributed and Mobile Message Level Relaying/Replaying of GNSS Signals

Authenticating GNSS civilian signals: a survey

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