Child Care and the Welfare to Work Transition

Lemke, Robert J.; Witte, Ann Dryden; Queralt, Magaly; Witt, Robert

doi:10.3386/w7583

Cited by 31 publications

(21 citation statements)

References 14 publications

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“…For example, Florida has an explicit priority system that it uses to allocate child care subsidies (see Queralt, et al, 2000 for a description), while Massachusetts has an implicit set of priorities that give preference to current and former cash assistance recipients over income-eligible families who have not participated in the cash assistance program (see Lemke, et al, 2001). The equity of some priority systems could be challenged.…”

Section: Indicators Of Trade Offs In Child Care Policiesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Take-Up Rates and Trade Offs After the Age of Entitlement: Some Thoughts and Empirical Evidence for Child Care Subsidies

Witte¹,

Queralt²

2002

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In this paper we develop a model of an eligible family's decision to take or not to take child care subsidies. This decision depends on the net benefits the family expects to derive from the subsidies over their expected duration. We contend that such a demand-side model for the take-up of child care subsidies and use of the term "take-up" rate are only appropriate for programs that guarantee services to all eligible applicants. After welfare reform, most states do not offer such guarantees. For states that do not guarantee subsidies, the proportion of the eligible population that receives subsidies is better called a service rate than a take-up rate. Modeling service rates requires consideration of both governments' decisions (the supply side) and families' decisions (the demand side) regarding child care subsidies.We survey the general literature on take-up rates for social welfare programs and review existing estimates of the take-up rates and service rates for child care subsidy programs in various states. Using administrative data and survey data for states that guarantee subsidies for all eligible families, we estimate the family-level take-up rate for child care subsidies to be around 40% in early 2000. For states that do not guarantee subsidies, service rates range from 14% in Minnesota to 50% in Massachusetts.Finally, we suggest indicators to assess the trade offs that governments are making when designing and funding their child care subsidy programs. We use the percent of federally eligible families that receive child care subsidies and public expenditures per subsidized child to discern the relative importance that states place on using child care subsidies (1) to facilitate parental work and (2) to prepare its future work force by improving services to low-income children. For Rhode Island, we find increasing emphasis on the latter between 1996 and 2000. We also find that the Illinois subsidized child care program places relatively more emphasis on parental work facilitation, while Minnesota's program makes a more substantial investment in children through relatively more comprehensive and in-depth services. In the human services, the term "take-up rate" generally refers to the proportion of the population eligible for a particular social welfare program that participates in the program. The reasonably large literature on take-up rates suggests that they vary considerably across programs. Specifically, recent surveys indicate that take-up rates range from 43% for the Qualified Medicare Beneficiary program to 99% for Medicare Part A. Take-up rates also vary as a result of using different estimation methodologies. For example, the estimated take-up rate for programs such as AFDC, Food Stamps and Medicaid, while consistently above 45%, shows a 20% to 25% variation across studies depending on methodologies used (Craig, 1991; Remler, Rachlin and Giled, 2001; U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 2001).In recent years, researchers have reported take-up rates for child care subsidies that...

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Section: Indicators Of Trade Offs In Child Care Policiesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Take-Up Rates and Trade Offs After the Age of Entitlement: Some Thoughts and Empirical Evidence for Child Care Subsidies

Witte¹,

Queralt²

2002

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“…In order to understand the effects of FIP on the employment and earnings of low-income families in RI, the impacts of these more general economic effects must be separated from the effects of the changes in the state's social welfare programs. Building upon ongoing work in Massachusetts and Florida (Queralt, Witte, and Griesinger, 2000;Lemke, Witt, & Witte, 2001), we use econometric modeling to evaluate the impact of the FIP program in Rhode Island on the likelihood of employment and earnings of low-income families.…”

Section: Acknowledgmentsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…To do this, we follow Eissa and Liebman (1996), Lemke, et al (2001), Meyer andRosenbaum (2001), Moffitt (1992) and Queralt, et al (2000). Table 1 lists the policy variables included as explanatory variables in our estimation.…”

Section: F F I P P a H C S D L M C C =mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Note that we have included separate variables for children that are of public school age. (See Blank, 1997;Eissa & Liebman, 1996;Harris, 1996;Kim & Mergoupis, 1997;Lemke, et al, 2001;Pavetti & Acs, 1997;and Queralt, et al, 2000 for reviews of the literature on socio-demographic factors affecting employment and earnings.) We control for Community Characteristics (CC) by including a series of community-specific binaries.…”

Section: F F I P P a H C S D L M C C =mentioning

confidence: 99%

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Evaluation of Rhode Island's Family Independence Program: May 1996 - April 2000

Witte

Queralt²,

Tauchen

2001

SSRN Journal

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“…To identify ", we assume that these factors are determined at the county level, and we treat county dummies as identifying instruments. We control for state fixed effects in the employment and other outcome 13 Lemke et al (2000) analyze the work behavior of child care voucher recipients in Massachusetts, using variation in local child care policy and other local variables to explain employment outcomes.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

The Determinants and Consequences of Child Care Subsidies for Single Mothers

Blau

Tekin

2003

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This paper provides an analysis of child care subsidies under welfare reform. Previous studies of child care subsidies use data from the pre-welfare-reform period, and their results may not apply to the very different post-reform environment. We use data from the 1999 National Survey ofAmerica's Families to analyze the determinants of receipt of a child care subsidy and the effects of subsidy receipt on employment, school attendance, job search, and welfare participation. We analyze the impact on subsidy receipt of household characteristics such as family size and structure, and past participation in welfare. The most important determinant of receipt of a child care subsidy is past receipt, but we cannot determine from our analysis whether this is a causal effect or a result of unobserved heterogeneity. Ordinary least squares estimates that treat subsidy receipt as exogenous show an effect of subsidy receipt of about 13 percentage points on employment. Two stage least squares estimates that treat subsidy receipt as endogenous and use county dummies as identifying instruments show an effect of 32 percentage points. We present some evidence that is consistent with the assumption that county dummies are valid identifying instruments, and some evidence that is inconsistent with the assumption.

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Child Care and the Welfare to Work Transition

Cited by 31 publications

References 14 publications

Take-Up Rates and Trade Offs After the Age of Entitlement: Some Thoughts and Empirical Evidence for Child Care Subsidies

Take-Up Rates and Trade Offs After the Age of Entitlement: Some Thoughts and Empirical Evidence for Child Care Subsidies

Evaluation of Rhode Island's Family Independence Program: May 1996 - April 2000

The Determinants and Consequences of Child Care Subsidies for Single Mothers

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