Chile — right to free will needs definition

In recent years, philosophical-legal studies on neuroscience (mainly in the fields of neuroethics and neurolaw) have given increasing prominence to a normative analysis of the ethical-legal challenges in the mind and brain sciences in terms of rights, freedoms, entitlements and associated obligations. This way of analyzing the ethical and legal implications of neuroscience has come to be known as “neurorights.” Neurorights can be defined as the ethical, legal, social, or natural principles of freedom or entitlement related to a person’s cerebral and mental domain; that is, the fundamental normative rules for the protection and preservation of the human brain and mind. Although reflections on neurorights have received ample coverage in the mainstream media and have rapidly become a mainstream topic in the public neuroethics discourse, the frequency of such reflections in the academic literature is still relatively scarce. While the prominence of the neurorights debate in public opinion is crucial to ensure public engagement and democratic participation in deliberative processes on this issue, its relatively sporadic presence in the academic literature poses a risk of semantic-normative ambiguity and conceptual confusion. This risk is exacerbated by the presence of multiple and not always reconcilable terminologies. Several meta-ethical, normative ethical, and legal-philosophical questions need to be solved in order to ensure that neurorights can be used as effective instruments of global neurotechnology governance and be adequately imported into international human rights law. To overcome the shortcomings above, this paper attempts to provide a comprehensive normative-ethical, historical and conceptual analysis of neurorights. In particular, it attempts to (i) reconstruct a history of neurorights and locate these rights in the broader history of idea, (ii) outline a systematic conceptual taxonomy of neurorights, (iii) summarize ongoing policy initiatives related to neurorights, (iv) proactively address some unresolved ethico-legal challenges, and (v) identify priority areas for further academic reflection and policy work in this domain.

Section: Derivatives Of Freedom Of Thoughtmentioning

confidence: 99%

On Neurorights

Ienca

2021

“…Furthermore, if neuroscience has allegedly created a case against free will, since the proposed experiments (Libet et al, 1983 ; Haggard and Eimer, 1999 ; Soon et al, 2008 , 2013 ; Fried et al, 2011 ), it seems contradictory to suggest the creation of a “Neuro” Right to free will. In this perspective, trying to elevate “Free will” as a category of human rights seems deeply complicated in conceptual terms (Muñoz, 2019 ; Borbón et al, 2020 ). In this sense, we envision that a right, under the philosophical baggage of free will, should not be incorporated.…”

Section: Neuroright To Free Willmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Critical Perspective on NeuroRights: Comments Regarding Ethics and Law

Rodríguez

Borbón

2021

“…In December 2020, the Chilean Senate approved a bill introducing a number of neurorights to be protected and a draft constitutional reform aimed at including the concept of protection from neurotechnology threats in the country’s new fundamental charter ( Muñoz, 2019 ; Bosoer, 2021 ).…”

Section: Introduction: Protection From Neurotechnology Threats In Practicementioning

confidence: 99%

What Should We Do With People Who Cannot or Do Not Want to Be Protected From Neurotechnological Threats?

Inglese

Lavazza

2021

Neurotechnologies can pose a threat to people’s privacy and mental integrity. Hence the proposal of establishing neurorights (Ienca and Andorno, 2017) and technical principles for the implementation of these rights (Lavazza, 2018). However, concepts such as “the extended mind” and what might be called “the post-human objection” can be said to challenge this protection paradigm. On the one hand, it may be difficult to outline the cognitive boundaries between humans and machines (with the consequent ethical and legal implications). On the other hand, those who wish to make strong use of neurotechnologies, or even hybridize with them, reject the idea that privacy and mental integrity should be protected. However, from the latter view, issues may arise relating to the protection of persons entering into relationships with posthumanist people. This article will discuss these scenarios as well as the ethical, legal, social, and political issues that could follow from them.