Civil–Military Relations in Indonesia and the Philippines

Abstract

This article examines civil-military relations in Indonesia and the Philippines in the aftermath of the largely unexpected recent coup in Thailand. The central issue it investigates is whether Indonesia and the Philippines may prove equally susceptible to military intervention. The conclusion is that although the potential for coups in the Philippines can never be discounted, Indonesia looks surprisingly stable by contrast. One key cause of this apparent stability, it is argued, is the military's role in economic activities, which makes it more or less content with the status quo. Although the dynamics of civil-military relations are significantly different in both the Philippines and Thailand, all three cases suggest that there is a need to take the political economy of civil-military relations much more seriously if we wish to understand them fully in the contemporary era.

Patterns of Civilian Control of the Military in East Asia's New Democracies

“…First, success or failure in crafting civilian control could reflect to some degree the influence of the predecessor nondemocratic regime and the mode of democratic transition (Aguero 1995;Beeson 2008). From this perspective, Taiwan stands out as the country that had already inherited a relatively strong degree of civilian authority over the military before transition started.…”

Military Support of Citizens' Challenge in the Asian Industrialized Countries

“…In general, the military prefers to maintain its institutional integrity, or maintain cohesion and reputation across its ranks (Haggard and Kaufman 1997;Mason and Clements 2002;Beeson 2008;Ames 1987;Bunce 2003;Weeks 2003), and do so under conditions of the most resources and the least costs. If the government makes concessions and these placate citizens, the military is not pressed to act; otherwise, the military's options are to support the government, support citizens' challenge, support neither and launch a coup, or not take sides and not launch a coup.…”

“…First, among incentives to the military, defense spending is the most systematically documented and tangible." Second, government expenditures rank among the most important pieces of legislation passed in any year to manipulate political support or survival, and defense spending remains a high priority for the military and its advocates (Ames 1987;Kwon 2005;Beeson 2008). Third, defense spending is not transferred in one lump payment to the military; this rules out potential military "cheating" behavior, such as the military's offering support to the government in order to obtain the resources but supporting citizens' challenge instead so as not to incur fighting costs.…”

The Military Coups in Fiji: Reactive and Transformative Tendencies

“…Nevertheless, there are local peculiarities which make some situations unique. A comparative study of the potential for coups in the Philippines (where the military has been involved in anti-corruption campaign) and Indonesia shows that Indonesia was less prone to coups because of the direct involvement of the military in corporate investment and other economic activates thus making it contented with the status quo (Beeson, 2008). Understanding the political economy of the military is also important to come to terms with its political and ideological positioning.…”