Coalition Games in Fisheries Economics

Lindroos, Marko; Kaitala, Veijo; Kronbak, Lone Grønbæk

doi:10.1002/9780470751589.ch11

Cited by 25 publications

(20 citation statements)

References 27 publications

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“…Applications of game theory in fisheries can be divided into three broad categories: non-cooperative, cooperative and coalition games (see reviews by Sumaila 1999;Lindroos et al 2007;Bailey et al 2010). Non-cooperative games assume that each player maximizes self interest and can be used to study situations where players compete for the resource.…”

Section: Game Theorymentioning

confidence: 99%

Theories and behavioural drivers underlying fleet dynamics models

et al. 2011

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International audienceIn the domain of decision-support tools for the management of marine fish resources, considerable attention has been paid to the development of models explaining how fish stocks change over space and time. In most models, fishing effort is assumed to be exogenous and determined by factors such as management. Increasingly, there has been a call for bio-economic models to also account for the dynamics of fishing fleets, recognizing that fishers respond to changing environmental, institutional and economic conditions. A growing literature has sought to explicitly model the endogenous determinants of the capacity of fishing fleets, the intensity of its use and its temporal and spatial allocation across fishing opportunities. We review this literature, focusing on empirical applications of the behavioural models that have been put forward to explain and predict observed fleet dynamics. We find that although economic factors are usually included as a dominant driver in most studies, this is often based on the use of proxy variables for the key economic drivers, for which adequate data are lacking. Also, while many studies acknowledge that social and social-psychological factors play a significant role in explaining observed fishing behaviour, their inclusion in fishing fleet dynamic models is still very limited. Progress in this domain can only be achieved via the development of multidisciplinary research programmes focusing on applied quantitative analysis of the drivers of fishing fleet dynamics

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Section: Game Theorymentioning

confidence: 99%

Theories and behavioural drivers underlying fleet dynamics models

et al. 2011

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“…To cope with this type of problems, game theory provides a toolbox to analyze the interactions; in particular the cooperative game approach has been commonly applied in resource games (see Folmer et al 1998). 16 Over the years, there have been several reviews on the application of game theory from a historical development (see for instance Munro, 1998, 2003;Sumaila, 1999;Lindroos et al, 2007;Bailey et al, 2010). The following section does not intend to repeat or refine these overview papers on the historical development but rather to take the offset in the resource and the development around understanding the characteristics of the resources and to relate to the foresights in Bjørndal and Munro (2003), Sumaila (1999), Lindroos et al (2007) and Bailey et al (2010) to this.…”

Section: International Dimensionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Recent Developments in Fisheries Economics Research

Kronbak

Squires

Vestergaard

2014

IRERE

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Fisheries economics stand on the cusp of potentially sizeable changes in orientation and policy focus, leading in turn to comparable changes in modeling and general analysis. Notably, fisheries are increasingly framed as part of the overall marine environment rather than considered as solely or largely a commercial fishing issue. Other changes further challenge this traditional conceptual foundation, including technological change, multiple externalities, asymmetric information, marine planning and strategic interactions among players that are especially pronounced in international settings. This paper contends there is a potential for re-development of fishery economic models related to fishery and marine economics in several directions also related to the economic foundation.

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“…Note that there is no guarantee that all or any of these approaches will lead to a stable coalition structure, that is, one that is rational to all players. A review of a coalitional fisheries games was undertaken in Lindroos et al (2007).…”

Section: Coalitions: Characteristic-function Approachmentioning

confidence: 99%