2015
DOI: 10.17487/rfc7607
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Codification of AS 0 Processing

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Cited by 5 publications
(2 citation statements)
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“…When such ASPAs have been issued, an adversary cannot bypass ASPV even using the ASPA-aware attack as shown in Figure 21: because the malicious routes composed in the manner of the ASPA-aware attack have AS0 in AS_PATH, but it is not allowed in the BGP protocol specification [30].…”
Section: ) Impact On As Topologymentioning
confidence: 99%
“…When such ASPAs have been issued, an adversary cannot bypass ASPV even using the ASPA-aware attack as shown in Figure 21: because the malicious routes composed in the manner of the ASPA-aware attack have AS0 in AS_PATH, but it is not allowed in the BGP protocol specification [30].…”
Section: ) Impact On As Topologymentioning
confidence: 99%
“…We split them in two sub-categories: 799 ASNs that at a certain point in time were allocated but had at least one BGP life entirely outside of any administrative life and 868 ASNs that have never been allocated. Note that we exclude from our analysis łbogonž ASNs normally filtered by operators, i.e., ASNs reserved for special use [1,29,40,44,50,75].…”
Section: Operational Lives Without Allocationmentioning
confidence: 99%