Although Ioris and Ioris (2018) provide a correct and insightful understanding of the rural historical origins of the Colombian conflict, their interpretation of the Havana Accord-held from 2012 to 2016-is flawed. Their argument reinforces the status quo and official views held by the state. According to the authors, the agreement is not and should not be thought of as a process of state reform. In contrast, I argue that the peace agreement proposed in Colombia should be seen as a presidential and elite-driven 1 social pact that turned into a political and electoral dispute, transforming the peacebuilding process in Colombia into a wobbly endeavour. To better understand the complexity of the Havana Accord, the traditional land claim perspective should be re-centred as an inequality reduction and a long-term development plan. Throughout this article, I point out new directions to the challenges faced by the collapsing agreement.