Coming into the cold: Asia's Arctic interests

Abstract

In their Arctic strategy documents, the five Arctic coastal states (Canada, Greenland/Denmark, Norway, Russia, and the USA) all point to increased traffic and regional activity as a promising economic possibility and a security and governance challenge. These developments have not gone unnoticed by nonArctic states who have demonstrated an increasing interest in the region, most noticeably through their successful applications to gain permanent observer status in the preeminent regional forum Á the eight-country Arctic Council. We argue that the rising interest of non-Arctic actors highlights some interesting questions about how governance in the region will develop and how Arctic states envision the region's global significance. This article engages with questions about Arctic governance through a study of the Arctic interests of four Asian states (China, Japan, Singapore, and South Korea) and how Arctic states are meeting this increased interest. We focus on the varied reception of non-Arctic states by established Arctic actors, namely the USA, Russia, and Norway, and how they have reacted to the idea of Asian observer states in the Arctic Council. This study is primarily based on a set of qualitative interviews with civil servants and nonstate actors engaged in Arctic governance, media reports and primary documents.

Arctic governance

“…These interviews took place between 2004 and 2017. Especially intense periods of formal qualitative interviewing took place in (resulting in Wilson, 2007a, 2007 (resulting in Wilson Rowe, 2009(with Helge Blakkisrud, resulting in Wilson Rowe and Blakkisrud, 2014 and 2013 (with Per Erik Solli and Wrenn Yennie Lindgren, resulting in Solli et al, 2013). These interviews were focused on Arctic actors from Russia, Norway, the USA and Canada, with a few interviewees with Finnish and Danish backgrounds as well.…”

“…All of the states demonstrated a concern for climate change (of which the rapidly warming Arctic is a key barometer) and most mentioned maritime traditions and economic interests. By the time of the Kiruna ministerial session, all of the East Asian observer applicants had underlined their respect for the pre-eminent position of Arctic states and accepted the premises of international law in governing the region, in particular UNCLOS (Solli et al, 2013). At the same time, these countries had, at times, engaged in some creative work in 'framing' the Arctic in a way that lent logic to their desire to secure their position within the Arctic Council.…”

“…Others, such as the USA, Canada and Russia were taciturn. Interviews conducted with decision-makers in 2013 indicated that the USA, Canada and Russia had not yet made their decisions plain -even at the behest of the Swedish SAO to put all cards on the table in advance of the ministerial session (Solli et al, 2013).…”

“…The amendment (the 'Nuuk criteria') required aspiring observers to submit comprehensive applications detailing how they fulfilled the seven observer criteria, including demonstration of Arctic interests; financial and material contributions to the work of the Council; recognition of the Arctic states' sovereignty and jurisdiction over the region; and support for the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, the prevailing legal framework for the Arctic. Furthermore, the Task Force on Institutional Cooperation had produced, during the Swedish chairmanship, an 'Observer Manual' , which had been pushed for especially strongly by Russia and Canada (Solli et al, 2013). The manual sets specific criteria across the board for both previous and incoming permanent observers with a focus on form and procedure within the Arctic Council -who sits where and who is allowed to speak in what order -as well as making specifications about expectations of and limits to the financial contributions of observers to Arctic Council work (Arctic Council Secretariat, 2013).…”

China in the Arctic: interests, actions and challenges

“…5 As representatives from both applicants have given statements challenging the current political order in the North, the acceptance of China and the EU has indeed been controversial within the AC (Wright 2011: 28, Sun 2013, Jakobsen and Peng 2012: 15, Wegge 2012, Solli et. al.…”