2004
DOI: 10.1016/j.comnet.2004.03.021
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Comparing economic incentives in peer-to-peer networks

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Cited by 93 publications
(79 citation statements)
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“…Second, many studies have shown that heavy users of p2p …le sharing networks are more prone to purchase content online. 2 Our framework not only suggests that there is no contradiction in this observed behavior, but also sheds light on the factors that explain the demand for online content in the presence of a p2p network. Third, we provide insights on content pricing and the e¤ectiveness of industry initiatives such as suing heavy sharers.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 65%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…Second, many studies have shown that heavy users of p2p …le sharing networks are more prone to purchase content online. 2 Our framework not only suggests that there is no contradiction in this observed behavior, but also sheds light on the factors that explain the demand for online content in the presence of a p2p network. Third, we provide insights on content pricing and the e¤ectiveness of industry initiatives such as suing heavy sharers.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 65%
“…Altruistic agents, for example, realize a direct bene…t from contributing content. Golle et al [14] and Antoniadis et al [2] consider agents that derive utility from contributing content to the network. Feldman et al [13] explicitly consider agent types which di¤er in their willingness to contribute.…”
Section: Literaturementioning
confidence: 99%
“…Many subsequent studies have examined the public good aspect of P2P networks. 5 In particular, Krishnan, Smith, Tang, and Telang (2004), Antoniadis, Courcoubetis, and Mason (2004), and Antoniadis, Courcoubetis, and Strulo (2005) find that the equilibrium level of sharing is below the social optimum and propose variations of soft incentive schemes to reduce free-riding. Other papers that study soft incentive schemes include Buragohain, Agrawal, and Suri (2003), Kamvar, Schlosser, and GarciaMolina (2003), Habib andChuang (2006), Feldman, Papadimitriou, Chuang, andStoica (2006), and Van der Schaar and Turaga (2008).…”
Section: Related Literaturementioning
confidence: 99%
“…6 An exception is Antoniadis, Courcoubetis, and Mason (2004). In this paper each peer's private information is his preference parameter (type), whereas in our paper a peer's type is determined by the number of files he has.…”
Section: Related Literaturementioning
confidence: 99%
“…Several proposals based on such domain model have been introduced [24][25][26][27][28][29][30]. Furthermore, other approaches to build effective incentives schemes are based on the Mechanism Design (MD) and Distributed Algorithmic Mechanism Design (DAMD) [31] concepts.…”
Section: Background and Related Workmentioning
confidence: 99%