Compassionate Phenomenal Conservatism

Abstract

I defend the principle of Phenomenal Conservatism, on which appearances of all kinds generate at least some justification for belief. I argue that there is no reason for privileging introspection or intuition over perceptual experience as a source of justified belief; that those who deny Phenomenal Conservatism are in a self‐defeating position, in that their view cannot be both true and justified; and that the demand for a metajustification for Phenomenal Conservatism either is an easily met demand, or is an unfair or question‐begging one.

Explaining Moral Knowledge

“…See, e.g., Huemer (2007). 17 M&R take Moore's Open Question Argument to show that moral predicates cannot be analyzed into purely descriptive language and so that moral principles are not analytic.…”

Acquaintance and Fallible Non-Inferential Justification

“…13 I articulate Phenomenal Conservatism this way to make it closer to the wording of HP. For defenses of phenomenal conservatism and more official articulations of the view, see Huemer (2007), Lycan (2013), andTucker (2010;2011). hold necessarily, then the mention of probability in HP may not reflect substantive disagreement with PC. The proponent of PC may think there must be some sense in which seemings necessarily make their contents probable, otherwise why think that seemings necessarily justify their contents?…”

Percepção como fonte de crenças justificadas

“…A experiência perceptual (ou experiência sensorial), conforme Huemer (2001), é "definida como o componente mental, puramente interno, da percepção" (p. 58). Ora, se eu vejo um gato branco no telhado, poderia dar-se que essa experiência sensorial acontecesse mesmo que não houvesse qualquer gato branco no telhado.…”