Complexity of manipulation and bribery in judgment aggregation for uniform premise-based quota rules

Baumeister, Dorothea; Erdélyi, Gábor; Erdélyi, Olivia Johanna; Rothe, Jörg

doi:10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2015.03.006

Cited by 31 publications

(27 citation statements)

References 44 publications

(81 reference statements)

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“…Voting with constraints will be touched upon towards the end of the paper. Research in binary voting and judgment aggregation focused on the (non-)manipulability of judgment aggregation rules (Dietrich and List, 2007c;Botan et al, 2016) and its computational complexity (Endriss et al, 2012;Baumeister et al, 2015), but a fully-fledged theory of non-cooperative games in this setting has not yet been developed and that is our focus here.…”

Section: Contribution and Scientific Contextmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The field of computational social choice has extensively studied decision problems involved with various forms of election control (see (Faliszewski and Rothe, 2016), for a recent overview) such as: lobbying (Christian et al, 2007;Bredereck et al, 2014), bribery (Baumeister et al, 2015;Hazon et al, 2013), modelled from the single agent perspective of a lobbyist or briber who tries to influence voters' decisions through monetary incentives, or from the perspective of a coalition of colluders (Bachrach et al, 2011). Here we study a form of control akin to bribery, but where any voter can 'bribe' any other voter.…”

Section: Election Controlmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Negotiable Votes

Grandi¹,

Grossi²,

Turrini³

2019

jair

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We study voting games on binary issues, where voters hold an objective over the outcome of the collective decision and are allowed, before the vote takes place, to negotiate their voting strategy with the other participants. We analyse the voters' rational behaviour in the resulting two-phase game, showing under what conditions undesirable equilibria can be removed and desirable ones sustained as a consequence of the pre-vote phase. * This paper improves and extends work previously presented at the 24th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI'15) . The paper has benefited from the feedback of the anonymous reviewers at IJCAI'15, COMSOC'14 and LOFT'14. The authors are greatly indebted to Edith Elkind and Ulle Endriss for valuable comments on earlier versions of this work, and to the

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Section: Contribution and Scientific Contextmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Election Controlmentioning

confidence: 99%

Negotiable Votes

Grandi¹,

Grossi²,

Turrini³

2019

jair

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

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“…Research on election control has also affected research on related fields. For example, Baumeister et al [3] studied control in judgment aggregation.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Many algorithmic ideas of Faliszewski et al [20] are useful in our setting as well. Bribery was later studied by various researchers [8,22,24,39,49], sometimes in settings other than those regarding elections [3,40,45] (these references are meant as examples only, see the survey of Faliszewski, Hemaspaandra, and Hemaspaandra [21] for some more discussion). In particular, Faliszewski [19] and Elkind et al [15,16] introduced the idea of voter prices that depend on the extent to which a given vote is affected.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

The complexity of priced control in elections

Miasko

Faliszewski

2015

Ann Math Artif Intell

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We study the complexity of priced control in elections. Naturally, if a given control type is NP-hard for a given voting system E then its priced variant is NP-hard for this rule as well. It is, however, interesting what effect introducing prices has on the complexity of those control problems that without prices are tractable. We show that for four prominent voting rules (plurality, approval, Condorcet, and Copeland) introducing prices does not increase the complexity of control by adding/deleting candidates/voters. However, we do show an example of a scoring rule for which such an effect takes place.

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“…As argued by Faliszewski et al [FST17], such values can be far more informative than the score differences between the drivers. Bribery problems also appear in the contexts of lobbying [BEF + 07, BEF + 14], rating systems [GST18], or in combinatorial domains [BEER15].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Approximation and Hardness of Shift-Bribery

Faliszewski

Manurangsi

Sornat

2019

AAAI

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In the SHIFT-BRIBERY problem we are given an election, a preferred candidate, and the costs of shifting this preferred candidate up the voters' preference orders. The goal is to find such a set of shifts that ensures that the preferred candidate wins the election. We give the first polynomial-time approximation scheme for the SHIFT-BRIBERY problem for the case of positional scoring rules, and for the Copeland rule we show strong inapproximability results. * An extended abstract of this work appears in AAAI'19.

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Complexity of manipulation and bribery in judgment aggregation for uniform premise-based quota rules

Cited by 31 publications

References 44 publications

Negotiable Votes

Negotiable Votes

The complexity of priced control in elections

Approximation and Hardness of Shift-Bribery

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