Compositional Reasoning about Shared Futures

Din, Crystal Chang; Dovland, Johan; Owe, Olaf

doi:10.1007/978-3-642-33826-7_7

Cited by 6 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 19 publications

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“…Ultimately, the reason for that complication can be attributed to the more tighter coupling of objects in the multi-threaded setting. The general common-sense observation that loosely coupled systems entail a more compositional system description and especially simplify reasoning in a modular fashion is also exploited in Ahrendt and Dylla (2012), Din et al (2012) and Kurnia and Poetzsch-Heffter (2013) in the context of Hoare-style proof systems.…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Observable interface behaviour and inheritance

Ábrahám¹,

Tran²,

Steffen³

2014

Math. Struct. Comp. Sci.

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This paper formalizes the observable interface behaviour ofopensystems for a strongly-typed, concurrent object-oriented language with single-class inheritance. We formally characterize the observable behaviour in terms of interactions at the program-environment interface. The behaviour is given by transitions between contextual judgments, where the absent environment is represented abstractly as assumption context. A particular challenge is the fact that, when the system is considered as open, code from the environment can be inherited to the component and vice versa. This requires to incorporate an abstract version of the heap into the environment assumptions when characterizing the interface behaviour. We prove the soundness of the abstract interface description.

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Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Observable interface behaviour and inheritance

Ábrahám¹,

Tran²,

Steffen³

2014

Math. Struct. Comp. Sci.

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“…Variables are declared by the syntax var name : T = e where e is the initial value of type T . Creol has a small-step operational semantics defined by a set of rewrite rules in the Maude format [26], used for proving the soundness of analysis and verification [24,25,38], and also providing an executable interpreter.…”

Section: Ii23 Creolmentioning

confidence: 99%

Information-Flow Control by Means of Security Wrappers for Active Object Languages with Futures

2021

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In this thesis, we experiment with customizing programming languages to enforce privacy and security policies. We enforce privacy and security requirements at the level of a programming language when a program executes. We design a language and enrich it with the essential features to enforce the requirements. Moreover, we model our language with formal methods and prove that programs written in our language do not violate the desired policies. We design the language's syntax and semantics and formalize the operational semantics with mathematical logic, which enables us to reason about the language's properties.The structure of this thesis is described in the following. First, we introduce privacy and security policies that we want to enforce. We choose the GDPR (General Data Protection Regulation), which has strict requirements to protect the individual's privacy when processing personal data. For security, we give an overview of existing language-based techniques to preserve confidentiality and limit access to sensitive data. Second, we state the research questions that we want to handle in this thesis. Third, we introduce the tools and logic that we use for our research methods and modeling our languages. Finally, we present the research papers and relate the research questions to our contributions.The main contributions of this thesis are presented in three research papers. In the first paper, we introduce a programming language with provable guarantees that protects privacy and enforces the GDPR's requirements. The second paper gives an overview of a category of programming languages, called active object languages, that are used to develop distributed systems. In the third paper, we introduce a security mechanism to enforce security in active object languages. We discuss and prove that our language-based approaches are exact when it comes to enforcing policies and restrictions. Moreover, our approaches can be generalized to other languages.

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