Conflicts in multi-level governance: an analysis of international climate policy implementation at the sub-national level

Xu, Jingyuan

doi:10.1007/s43508-021-00029-4

Cited by 13 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 52 publications

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“…Incentives of local governments are also important in the dynamic process of transition [ 57 , 58 ]. We further consider that the local governments may require power plants to give priority to trading within the province.…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Market-based solution in China to finance the clean from the dirty

Qian

2024

Fundamental Research

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Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Market-based solution in China to finance the clean from the dirty

Qian

2024

Fundamental Research

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“…External imposition can occur in scope from a single issue with a limited number of partners to a host of policy areas with a complex encompassing network and a large number of participants (Feiock, 2013). Regarding imposition strategies, external authorities can employ existing administrative apparatuses and rules to elicit collaborators' compliance, mobilize resources to support collaboration, and negotiate to achieve mutual adjustments and arrangements among collaborators (Koliba et al, 2011; Xu, 2021). More complex external imposition strategies include facilitators or specialized “knowledge brokers” to determine who should be involved, and how to mobilize them (Stadtler & Karakulak, 2020).…”

Section: External Impositionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Influence of external authorities on collaborative frictions

Zhao

Wang

Cheung

et al. 2023

Public Administration Review

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When institutional frictions threaten to disrupt collaborations, an external authority can be brought in to resolve disputes. How effective is such external imposition? What are the institutional circumstances in which it works? Framed by the collaborative governance regime (CGR), which sees established procedures and institutions as a critical collaborative capacity, this research employs a unique concept-collaborative friction-to explore the role of external imposition in collaboration among entities with significant institutional differences. We examined 965 recorded collaborative frictions from four large collaborative infrastructure projects between governments in Hong Kong and mainland China. Our finding suggests a significant, but limited, effect of the central government's imposition on collaborative frictions. We also find a significant role of sociopolitical circumstances in collaboration. Based on the findings, we make several theoretical propositions articulating external imposition's role in collaboration. Evidence for practice• A large number of collaborative frictions can occur when collaborating institutions with different governing procedures and institutions interact. • The engagement of an external authority may improve collaboration through reducing collaborative frictions in short term. • External imposition may not necessarily improve collaboration in long term.• Controversial political issues could increase the difficulty for collaboration through creating or augmenting frictions in collaborating institutions. • Controversial political issues could also make the external authority's engagement in collaboration difficult to achieve expected outcomes.

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