Confronting Social Defence Mechanisms: Avoiding Disorganisation During Crises

Abstract

Crises cause social disturbances within their host organisation and the patterns of interpersonal ties that emerge are an important determinant of crisis management efficiency. In this article, social network analysis is used within a construction project context, to demonstrate that efficient crisis management depends upon the design and maintenance of an appropriate social fabric. However, crises have defence mechanisms that make management difficult by inducing forces that encourage people to pursue inappropriate social ties. Purposeful social intervention is therefore an essential part of the crisis management process to confront and avoid disorganisation.

Innovative Crisis Management in Construction: Approaches and the Process

“…However, these are far from investigating management practices of construction companies in the crisis process. In fact, they are specifically about theory formulation (Loosemore, 1999), communication structure (Loosemore, 1998e), contractual conditions (Loosemore and Hughes, 1998), real estate-based analysis (Kaklauskas et al, 2011), triple constraints composed of communication, sensitivity, and responsibility (Loosemore, 1998c), environmental and organizational factors (Ocal et al, 2006), organizational behavior (Loosemore, 1998b), reactive communication and behavior (Loosemore, 1998a), disorganization (Loosemore and Hughes, 2001), preparedness (Loosemore and Teo, 2000), social adjustment (Loosemore, 1997), and social network analysis (Loosemore, 1998d). Accordingly, the current study presents the first attempt in this regard.…”

Social network analysis studies in the public and private sectors: A cross‐professional comparison

“…Our search discovered a total of 21 articles, 14 from the private sector (Assimakopoulos, 2000; Baker & Faulkner, 2004; Bell, 2005; Borgatti & Cross, 2003; Cross, Borgatti, & Parker, 2001; Krackhardt & Kilduff, 2002; Loosemore & Hughes, 2001; MacCanna, Brennan, & O'Higgins, 1999; Mackenzie, 2003; Mehra, Kilduff, & Brass, 2001; Mohrman, Tenkasi, & Mohrman, 2003; Morton, Brookes, Smart, Backhouse, & Burns, 2004; Rowley, Behrens, & Krackhardt, 2000; Tenkasi & Chesmore, 2003) and seven from the public sector (Flap & Volker, 2001; Gains, 2003; Isett & Provan, 2005; Keast, Mandell, Brown, & Woolcock, 2004; Lamertz & Aquino, 2004; Moore, Eng, & Daniel, 2003; Thurmaier & Wood, 2002). Based on an analysis of these articles, we found the following to be interesting and worth noting: The majority of the time, both sectors exhibited research rigor by formally stating research questions and/or hypotheses (e.g., Krackhardt & Kilduff, 2002; Isett & Provan, 2005); About half of the studies in both the private and public sectors used a single method of collecting data, such as interviews or questionnaires/surveys (e.g., Mohrman et al, 2003; Flap & Volker, 2001).…”

Organisations in Disaster

“…Organisations will pursue their own agendas, thereby generating both contradiction and complementarity. Communities will pursue their own, often parallel, routes to response and recovery and mitigation (Benini 1999;Loosemore and Hughes 2001;Palmer 2001;Prater and Wu 2002;Juratowitch et al 2003;Silberbauer 2003;Spillan 2003). All of these diverse players-individuals, local and community organisations, media, GROs, NGOs, government institutions and departments, emergency services, military and international organisations and agencies-come to a disaster with an equally diverse range of ideas, approaches, agendas and needs.…”