Consciousness

Lycan, William G.

doi:10.1017/cbo9781139033916.014

Cited by 49 publications

(59 citation statements)

References 55 publications

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“…The senses are just in between and can be thought of either way. (See Lycan, 1981, 1987 One of the troubles with color vision is that a given stimulation pattern of our three kinds of cones can be, and often is, caused by lots of different combinations of wavelengths of light, and that each of these combinations of wavelengths can in turn be caused by lots of different physical properties of the object perceived, making the disjunction of physical properties that can, and often do, result in a given phenomenal color experience very large. Color vision is a much less useful detector of physical regularities than it is given credit for.…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Phenomenal Properties as Dummy Properties

Hall

2006

Philos Stud

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Can the physicalist consistently hold that representational content is all there is to sensory experience and yet that two perceivers could have inverted phenomenal spectra? Yes, if he holds that the phenomenal properties the inverts experience are dummy properties, not instantiated in the physical objects being perceived nor in the perceivers' experiences. In fact, he should probably hold that phenomenal properties don't exist at all. All there are, as far as phenomenal properties go, are phenomenal property experiences.

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Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Phenomenal Properties as Dummy Properties

Hall

2006

Philos Stud

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“…Other versions of the Illusion Hypothesis are developed by Lycan (1987Lycan ( , 1996, Loar (1990Loar ( /1997, Tye (1999), Perry (2001), Melnyk (2002), and Balog (manuscript). 6 I will make a few remarks about some of these other versions below, but the focus will be on Papineau's view.…”

Section: Preliminariesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Is the mystery an illusion? Papineau on the problem of consciousness

Sundström

2007

Synthese

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A number of philosophers have recently argued that (i) consciousness properties are identical with some set of physical or functional properties and that (ii) we can explain away the frequently felt puzzlement about this claim as a delusion or confusion generated by our different ways of apprehending or thinking about consciousness. This paper examines David Papineau's influential version of this view. According to Papineau, the difference between our "phenomenal" and "material" concepts of consciousness produces an instinctive but erroneous intuition that these concepts can't co-refer. I claim that this account fails. To begin with, it is arguable that we are mystified about physicalism even when the account predicts that we shouldn't be. Further, and worse, the account predicts that an "intuition of distinctness" will arise in cases where it clearly does not. In conclusion, I make some remarks on the prospects for, constraints on, and (physicalist) alternatives to, a successful defence of the claim (ii).

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“…On the other hand, philosophers point out that, from the rst-person point of view, qualia do not seem to be introspectively analyzable into more basic constituents (see, for example, Lycan, 1987Lycan, , 1996. To be sure, qualia do not seem to be introspectively analyzable.…”

Section: Connectionism and Qualia Reductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Capturing qualia: Higher-order concepts and connectionism

Cunningham

2001

Philosophical Psychology

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Antireductionist philosophers have argued for higher-order classi cations of qualia that locate consciousness outside the scope of conventional scienti c explanations, viz., by classifying qualia as intrinsic, basic, or subjective properties, antireductionists distinguish qualia from extrinsic, complex, and objective properties, and thereby distinguish conscious mental states from the possible explananda of functionalist or physicalist explanations. I argue that, in important respects, qualia are intrinsic, basic, and subjective properties of conscious mental states, and that, contrary to antireductionists' suggestions, these higher-order classi cations are compatible with qualia reduction. I demonstrate this compatibility by examining the putative higher-order properties of qualia and comparing them to the higher-order properties characteristic of connectionist models of cognitive processes. I contend that the higher-order properties characteristic of connectionist networks approximate (in intertheoretic terms) the putative higher-order properties of qualia suf ciently well to conclude that qualia reductionism can (1) accommodate claims that qualia are intrinsic, basic, and subjective properties, and (2) explain the motivating intuitions for those claims generated by inverted, absent, and alien qualia thought experiments. In this way I argue that (approximate versions of) the putative higher-order classi cations of qualia not only fail to defeat qualia reduction but, ironically, turn out to support it.

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Consciousness

Cited by 49 publications

References 55 publications

Phenomenal Properties as Dummy Properties

Phenomenal Properties as Dummy Properties

Is the mystery an illusion? Papineau on the problem of consciousness

Capturing qualia: Higher-order concepts and connectionism

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