JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org. This content downloaded from 192.231.202.205 on Wed, 01 Apr 2015 12:08:30 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 24 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHYFrom the point of view of both the F-C model and Putnam's theory, however, the aitiational framework contains an important lacuna. Both the F-C model and Putnam's theory provide for some device that guarantees success in communication. In the F-C model identical representations of intensions, and, in the Putnam model, identical purely referential uses secure firm ground for communication. In the aitiational theory nothing guarantees communication. It is simply assumed that there is enough overlap among the aitiational schemes of speakers to make communication, in most cases, possible. The overlaps allow communication, or partial communication, between scientists from one generation to another, between scientists and laypersons, between children and adults, or simply among speakers on the same level.Is this a defect? Must something in a semantic theory guarantee communication?Nothing guarantees the human sharing of thoughts, emotions, and feelings. And yet the assumption that such sharing takes place frequently-no matter how imperfectly-is an assumption without which we could not make sense of human experience.
J. M. E. MORAVCSIKStanford University FORM, FUNCTION, AND FEEL * IN the 1950's, U. T. Place and J. J. C. Smart proposed to identify mental states and events with neurophysiological states and events. A main advantage claimed for this identification was its avoidance of certain troublesome objections to earlier, behaviorist versions of materialism, objections designed to enforce our recalcitrant feeling that at least some mental states are genuinely inner states of persons and have distinctive, introspectible phenomenal characters. But complaints of this type have stayed with us, and are still raised against contemporary materialist views of all sorts. My purpose in this paper is to formulate and defend the ma-* Earlier versions of this paper have been presented at Tufts University, the University of Western Australia, and the 1978 Australasian Association of Philosophy Conference. I owe thanks to many people, especially to Dan Dennett, Ned Block, and David Armstrong for prolonged discussion of the issues treated here, and to the students and colleagues who attended my 1978 seminar at the University of Sydney for their many useful comments. 0022-362X/81/7801/0024 $02.60 e 1981 The Journal of Philosophy, Inc.This content downloaded from 192.231.202.205 on Wed, 01 Apr 2015 12:08:30 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions FORM, FUNCTION, AND FEEL 25terialist theory that I think has the best chance of turning aside these...
