The Case for Phenomenal Externalism

The Epistemology of Perception

“…If a mental state is partly constituted by having the contents it does, then according to these externalist theories, having those contents is both a constitutive feature of the state and a causal feature of it. Externalist theories are applied to the contents of visual experiences by Dretske 1997, Tye 1995, Lycan 2001, Burge 2003, Stalnaker 2003. Lycan and Dretske identify the phenomenal character of experiences with the property of having specific content.…”

Varieties of representationalism and their approach to sensory experience

“…Phenomenal externalism is a claim about the nature of the representation relation itself, a claim implied by certain accounts of mental representation which identify the property or set of properties in virtue of which an experience phenomenal character and content is fixed or determined. Lycan (1996Lycan ( , 2001, Byrne (2001), Harman (1997), Dretske (1995) and Tye (1995Tye ( , 2000 are just a few of the more prominent representatives who comprise the distinguished band of phenomenal externalists today.…”

The Way Ripe Tomatoes Look: An Argument Against Externalist Representationalism

“…One externalist representationalist commentator on Block's Inverted Earth story, Lycan (1996Lycan ( , 2001Lycan ( , 2004, has complained that if there is a representational shift (Lycan's official view is that there is no such shift in the story as told. ), then, intuitions be damned, there is a phenomenal shift as well.…”

“…Block (1996Block ( , 1998 has attempted to supply an independent reason, arguing that facts about what you, in your role in the story of Inverted Earth, will remember about your past experiences imply, or at least provide evidence for, the claim that there is no phenomenal shift. Lycan (1996Lycan ( , 2001Lycan ( , 2004 and Tye (1995Tye ( , 1998 have responded by pointing out that externalists can hold that the environmental differences between Earth and Inverted Earth will affect the representational contents of your memory beliefs just as much as they will affect the contents of your experiences.…”